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I'd make my Supreme Court down in Texas,
And there wouldn't be no killers gettin' off free.
If they were found guilty,
Then they would hang quickly,
Instead of writin' books and smiling on T.V.
Hank Williams, Jr.
If the South would have won
(We'd have had it made).
Introduction
Hank doesn't need to worry about moving the Court to Texas. The
one in Washington, D.C., is doing just fine. In a series of cases decided in
the 1989 Term, the Court dramatically affected-some would say al-
tered-habeas corpus doctrine. The Court seriously narrowed the range
of issues that may be raised in collateral proceedings. These decisions
have paved the way for the acceleration of executions. Although the im-
pact of these decisions is not limited to the capital context,1 it is there
that the consequences will be most dramatic. In addition, irrespective of
the merits of these decisions in other areas of doctrine, their application
to the claims of death row inmates is profoundly inappropriate. This
Article will thus focus on the impact of Teague v. LaneI and its progeny3
on the imposition of the death penalty.
Starting with the recent decision in Teague, the Court has crafted a
habeas corpus doctrine that seems oblivious to the premium it places on
innovative lawyering. Yet place such a premium it does. The unsettling
consequence is that death row inmates, who ordinarily do not receive the
most creative lawyers that the system has to offer, will find themselves
procedurally out of luck. This is a cruel irony, especially since the Court
has been unanimous in affirming that the procedure followed in the capi-
1. Indeed, Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), which I discuss in greater detail below
and which is central to my argument, was a non-capital case. See infra Part I; see also
Nadworny v. Fair, 744 F. Supp. 1194, 1209-10 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying retroactivity rule
announced in Teague to preclude a defendant convicted of second-degree murder and sen-
tenced to life from taking advantage of the new rule extending the requirement of a lesser-
included offense instruction to non-capital cases).
2. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The literature pertaining to Teague in general is already substan-
tial. See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner's Dilemma: Life in the Lower Courts After Teague
v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371, 418-19 (1991) (concluding that effects of Teague are still uncer-
tain); Ellen E. Boshkoff, Note, Resolving Retroactivity After Teague v. Lane, 65 IND. L.J. 651,
672-74 (1990) (proposing an "individual exception" to Teague for the purpose of allowing
habeas petitioners to receive relief from arguably unfair convictions).
3. See infra notes 27-30 and accompanying text. Teague's progeny include Butler v.
McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990), and Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), which I discuss in
substantial detail; and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), which I discuss less fully.
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tal context demands especial care and scrutiny.4 The arguments ad-
vanced in support of the distinctive quality of the capital context are
trite-that the death sentence is final, irrevocable, and qualitatively
unique'-but this does not render them any less compelling. By placing
such a premium on innovative lawyering, the Court has betrayed its erst-
while insistence that death sentences receive the highest scrutiny. It has
made the choice between death and life intolerably arbitrary, subject to a
fortuity that turns less on the circumstances of the offense than on the
relative skill of the defendant's lawyer.
How the Court could sanction such capriciousness in the capital
context is an interesting question, the answer to which has to do, in my
judgment, with what the Court is.6 Who we are has a great deal to do
4. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Gregg, the plurality
upheld Georgia's death penalty statute only after satisfying itself that the sentencing proce-
dures channeled the jury's discretion and contained additional safeguards against arbitrariness
by requiring state appellate review of all death sentences. Id. at 188-207 (Stewart, J., joined by
Powell and Stevens, JJ.). In their opinion concurring in the judgment, Justices White and
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger likewise scrutinized these features of the Georgia sentenc-
ing procedures. Id. at 220-26.
See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) C" '[T]he penalty of death is qualita-
tively different' from any other sentence." (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,
305 (1976)). Although the Court was fragmented in its ultimate reversal of Lockett's death
sentence, each opinion that addressed the validity of Ohio's death penalty statute closely ex-
amined the sentencing procedures. Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by Justices Powell
and Stevens, held the Ohio statute infirm because its procedures did not allow the jury amply
to consider mitigating circumstances. Id. at 608. Justice Blackmun, concurring separately,
similarly focused on the fact that the statute did not permit the sentencing authority to con-
sider the degree of the defendant's participation in the homicide. Id. at 658-61. Justice Mar-
shall adhered to his categorical opposition to the death penalty, see e.g., infra text
accompanying note 250, but he also insisted that when a life is at stake the Court must demand
"fine precision in the process." 438 U.S. at 620. Likewise, Justice White, concurring in the
judgment, expressed concern that the petitioner had been sentenced to death without a finding
of intention to kill. Id. at 624. Finally, even Justice Rehnquist, who would not have reversed
Lockett's sentence, voiced concern over the problem of allowing juries too much discretion.
Id. at 631.
The finest discussion of the principles in the central death penalty cases is Ronald J.
Mann, The Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author). See also Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super
Due Process for Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1143 (1980). But see William S. Geimer, Death at
Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards,
12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737 (1985).
5. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring) (not-
ing uniqueness of death penalty in its total irrevocability, its rejection of rehabilitation, and its
absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in the notion of humaneness); see also Mann,
supra note 4. But see Daniel R. Harris, Note, Capital Sentencing After Walton v. Arizona: A
Retreat from the "Death is Different" Doctrine, 40 AM. U. L. Rv. 1389 (1991).
6. Let me make clear that I do not mean this to be the slightest bit pejorative. The Court
comprises the very paragon of the legal profession; it is emphatically not a cross section. Thus,
to adumbrate a bit, it is not surprising that the members of the Court have not had dealings
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with what we know. This is why, for example, Jews after the Holocaust
are not-and cannot be-the same as we were before.7 It is why one who
has endured great pain or loss comes to possess a different perspective. It
is what we mean when we talk about growing from experience. It is why
closeness to death changes one's view of life.' It is why the more one
learns about the criminal justice system, the more uncomfortable one be-
comes with the death penalty and the more one worries that our values
are being sullied.9
In Harris County, Texas, in 1987, seven indigent defendants stood
trial for capital murder. All seven were convicted and sentenced to
death.10 The prosecutors batted a thousand. Their opponents were
court-appointed lawyers, not public defenders, whose fees were set at a
fraction of what they could make representing paying clients, 1 thus re-
moving an incentive to pursue the cases assiduously even if the lawyers
were talented enough to do so. In that same year in Dade County, Flor-
ida, where an excellent public defender system provides representation to
indigent defendants, twenty-seven out of thirty men convicted of capital
murder received life sentences.' 2 The prosecutors batted just one out of
with the likes of the attorneys who are often called upon to represent indigent capital defend-
ants. When I say, therefore, that the Court does not "know" what goes on in the bowels of the
system, I mean not merely that the Justices have not themselves typically defended indigent
capital defendants, or even that they have not periodically personally encountered and ob-
served the performance of a remarkably inept attorney, but that they are not aware of the level
of legal assistance that is routinely provided to indigent capital defendants in states without
public defender systems.
7. See, eg., RICHARD L. RUBINSTEIN, AFTER AUSCHWrrz (1966); ELIEZER
BERKOvrrs, FAITH AFTER THE HOLOCAUST (1973); ANDRE NEHER, THE EXILE OF THE
WORD (1981).
8. This is why Schopenhauer regarded suicide as evidence of a concealed will for life
(and why Pascal said that it is easier to die than to think about death without dying). See
MARTI LEIMBACH, DYING YOUNG 229, 276 (1990) (nicely juxtaposing the Schopenhauer and
Pascal insights).
9. For the concerns of a defense attorney, see, e.g., David Brnck, Decisions of Death,
NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1983, at 18. For similar views from prosecutors, see, e.g., Jason
DeParle, Special Report: A Matter of Life or Death, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE 2, 6
(1985) (reprinting articles published Apr. 7, 1985) (on fie with author) (quoting Orleans Par-
ish District Attorney Harry Connick, who characterized the death penalty as "random,
chance, throw of dice"; and quoting Terry Alarcon, former Orleans Parish Assistant District
Attorney, who noted that "[tihere's virtually no chance of someone wealthy getting the death
penalty").
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 27, 1991, at 20A (describing effort by court-appointed
lawyers in a capital case to recover $10,000 for 250 hours of work outside the courtroom ($40
per hour), where local guidelines limit such out-of-court expenses to $500).
12. The system used in Dade County relies heavily, but not exclusively, on public defend-
ers. See infra Part II.C. Of the capital defendants represented by public defenders in 1987,
none received a sentence of death. The competence of the so-called special assigned attorneys
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ten. The following year in Kentucky, nine defendants stood trial for cap-
ital murder. All were represented by public defenders, who are paid by
the state and who utilize state resources to do background investigation
that often does not get done in jurisdictions without public defender sys-
tems. Not a single one received the death penalty; all were sentenced to
life.13 The prosecutors struck out.
This type of data, which is presented in greater detail from a number
of jurisdictions below in Part II.C, suggests that the quality of lawyering
matters inordinately at the punishment phase of a capital trial, 14 and that
the better lawyering occurs in jurisdictions with public defender systems.
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, in its recent retroac-
tivity decisions, seems not to have recognized this.5 It certainly did not
acknowledge it. 6 Hence, the Court's development of doctrine in the
area of retroactive application of new rules seems to depend on an almost
willful lack of knowledge.
While this emerging "new rule" jurisprudence presupposes highly
skilled and innovative trial lawyers, the legal test currently utilized to
examine the effectiveness of counsel calls for only minimal competence.
Thus, although the constitutional demand of the Sixth Amendment im-
poses an extremely low threshold, 7 under new rule jurisprudence a de-
(employed primarily in cases in which there is a conflict with the office of the public defender)
varies widely, but these lawyers do have access to state resources for purposes of investigation
and pretrial work.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. I do not doubt that the difference also manifests itself at the guilt-innocence phase of a
capital trial. Indeed, some of the evidence presented infra Part II.C attests to a difference at
this earlier stage as well. Nevertheless, partly because the evidence for that conclusion is too
incomplete, and partly because my primary focus is on sentencing, this Article addresses only
the comparative performance of counsel at the punishment phase.
15. The Court's unwillingness to confront this feature of the system also has pernicious
ramifications in the context of procedural default, a distinct problem not addressed in this
Article. The relationship between procedural default and inadequate trial counsel, as well as
between that area of doctrine and recent doctrinal developments, was addressed most recently
by John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in
Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990).
16. See e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-310 (1989) (focusing instead on considera-
tions of finality in formulating retroactivity doctrine).
17. See, eg., Messer v. Kemp, 474 U.S. 1088 (1986) (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari). The attorney representing Messer at the sentencing phase
of his capital trial neglected to inform the jury that the defendant had no prior criminal record,
that he had been steadily employed, that he had received an honorable discharge from the
military, that he had been a regular churchgoer, and that he had cooperated with the police.
Id. at 1090. Even though the magistrate held that this neglect was sufficient to establish inef-
fectivenes-finding that this conduct had left the petitioner effectively without representation
at the sentencing phase-the district court nonetheless denied Messer relief, finding no reason-
able probability that "but for" this conduct Messer would have received a different sentence.
Id; see also Moore v. Maggio, 740 F.2d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 1984) (similarly refusing to find
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fendant will be fairly treated only if his attorney is brilliant. 8 The test
for ineffectiveness set out in Strickland v. Washington 19 ensures that very
few convictions will be disturbed because of alleged ineffectiveness.2"
Under the Strickland standard, a convicted defendant challenging the
efficacy of his or her counsel must meet the formidable barriers of estab-
lishing both that an error was made and that it probably altered the out-
come of the trial.21 Coupled with this test for ineffectiveness, the Court's
recent decisions in the area of retroactivity generate a doctrine that will
permit states regularly to execute their citizens even when a constitu-
tional violation has vitiated the process. This should give pause to even
the firmest supporters of capital punishment.22 Nevertheless, rather than
argue that the retroactivity doctrine is misguided-though I believe in
certain critical regards it is-I offer proposals in Part III that would re-
quire no alteration of the doctrine; indeed, they are an attempt to re-
spond to it.
In order for any death penalty statute to satisfy our constitutional
values (and indeed the values that the Court itself has steadfastly invoked
in the capital context), counsel who represent indigent capital defendants
ineffectiveness where death row habeas petitioner could not show that trial counsel's failure to
object to trial court errors at sentencing phase was unreasonable and prejudicial).
It is now clear beyond cavil that under the current test for ineffectiveness only the most
egregious instances of ineptitude lead to a finding of ineffectiveness. See Martin C. Calhoun,
Note, How to Thread the Needle; Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffec-
tive Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413 (1988); Paul Marcotte, Snoozing, Unpre-
pared Lawyer Cited, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 14-15. As an example of the degree of ineptitude
necessary to trigger a finding of ineffectiveness, this essay in the A.B.A. Journal notes the per-
formance of one James Venable, a former imperial wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, who slept a
"good deal" during the capital trial of his black client. Id at 14.
18. See the definition of brilliant embraced in David R. Dow, When Words Mean What
We Believe They Say: The Case ofArticle V, 76 IowA L. REv. 1 n.3 (1990): see also Daniel R.
Farber, The Case Against Brilliance, 70 MiNN. L. REV. 917 (1986) (arguing for thoughtfulness
rather than brilliance as a more valuable characteristic in legal thinking).
19. 466 U.S. 668 (1984); see also infra note 20 and accompanying text.
20. See Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Fatal Defense-Effective Assistance: Just a
Nominal Right?, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 42 (citing statistics which indicate that federal
circuit courts of appeals have granted capital defendants post-conviction relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel in only 24 of 97 cases). What is most interesting (and perhaps startling)
about the cited statistics is the differences between circuits. For example, while in the Seventh
Circuit all three capital defendants raising ineffectiveness challenges were granted relief under
Strickland, in the Fifth Circuit, only one of 31 death row inmates persuaded the court that he
had received ineffective assistance. See also Marcotte, supra note 17, at 14 (noting that only
three cases in Georgia have found ineffectiveness under Strickland).
21. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see infra Part II.A.
22. And it has. See, e.g., William F. Buckley, Jr., Execute Ronald Monroe; Analysis of
Evidence that Points to His Innocence, NAT'L REV., Sept. 15, 1989, at 63 (advocating pardon
for arguably innocent death row inmate while expressing the view that too few people receive
the death penalty).
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must be highly competent.23 The state may not take a citizen's life with-
out offering the citizen a meaningful opportunity to resist. This thesis is
dictated entirely by the Eighth Amendment, not the Sixth. Specifically,
my argument is that within the confines of Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence alone, the Court has rightly been loathe to accept arbitrariness and
fortuity in sentencing.' 4 Yet by employing both the Strickland test for
ineffectiveness and the Teague retroactivity standard in the capital con-
text, the Supreme Court has created a grotesquely arbitrary system,
much like the one Justice Douglas warned about in Furman v. Georgia-
a scheme where "anyone making more than $50,000 would be exempt
from the death penalty."2
No member of the Court has argued that original intent is disposi-
tive in the realm of capital punishment.26 Where the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause is concerned, the Court has been neither persuaded
by nor even interested in the question of whether a particular punishment
was in fact viewed by the Framers as cruel and unusual. This indiffer-
ence to originalism is not manifested with respect to the Court's analysis
of other constitutional provisions. Thus, whatever the merits of the
Strickland test for safeguarding the Sixth Amendment right to effective
counsel, the Eighth Amendment value is entirely distinct. Counsel
charged with defending an accused against the state's effort to take his or
her life must be more than minimally competent.
In view of the Court's own recognition of the special nature of the
death penalty, the general prohibition against retroactive application of
new rules is profoundly inappropriate in the context of capital punish-
ment. Capital defendants should be allowed the benefit of new rules.
Simply put, retroactivity jurisprudence ought not to apply in the realm of
the death penalty. As a normative proposition, this thesis can stand
alone. And in view of the scandalous quality of trial representation avail-
able to indigent capital defendants in jurisdictions without public de-
fender systems, the Court's refusal to permit death row inmates to avail
themselves of constitutionally mandated new rules is utterly indefensible.
23. This claim is rooted in and informed by the principle of comparative justice. For a
discussion of the principle, see JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 98-119 (1973) (explain-
ing that this principle, with its roots in Aristotle, requires that like cases be treated alike and
unlike cases be treated differently). Further, in view of current retroactivity law, trial counsel
must be super-competent, since collateral relief is increasingly unavailable.
24. See, eg., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (plurality opinion) (emphasizing
that although the death penalty is not per se unconstitutional, it may not be imposed under
arbitrary and capricious procedures).
25. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).
26. See generally Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted"
The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969); Mann, supra note 4.
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Part I of this Article reviews the Court's recent pronouncements in
the area of retroactivity of so-called new rules.27 The cases include
Teague v. Lane,28 Butler v. McKellar,29 and Saffle v. Parks.30 Penry v.
Lynaugh 31 is important primarily because it specifies unmistakably that
the retroactivity doctrine established by Teague, Butler, and Parks ap-
plies equally to cases involving petitioners on death row.3 2 Part II criti-
cizes the ramifications of these recent decisions. More particularly, Part
II summarizes the Strickland standard for ineffective assistance of coun-
sel, then examines typical death penalty representation in several states.
Frequently, the level of representation provided to indigent capital de-
fendants falls well below the quality that Teague and its progeny assume
is typical (and that they would therefore seem to demand), even though
the representation does ostensibly satisfy the Strickland standard. In ad-
dition, Part II presents data, collected here for the first time, that
strongly indicate the superiority of public defenders over court-appointed
private counsel in saving capital defendants from the gallows.
In view of this data and particular stories of lawyers' ineptitude in
capital proceedings, Part III proposes certain reforms. It specifically
urges the creation of a federal public defender's office for the purpose of
representing indigent capital defendants in states that do not have ade-
quate public defender offices. Also, in order for the sentencing schemes
to satisfy the Constitution, Part III suggests that counsel be permitted
either to waive the right to have a jury impose sentence or, alternatively,
to place before the jury evidence of heinous crimes committed by other
defendants in that jurisdiction which were not punished with the death
sentence.
Much attention has been paid in recent months to reforming the
rules of habeas corpus.33 The attention has been provoked in large part
27. See infra notes 64, 73 and accompanying text.
28. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
29. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
30. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
31. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
32. Id. at 313-14. When Teague was announced, this was by no means clear. See, eg.,
REPORT OF A.B.A. TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUs (1990) [hereinafter
A.B.A. REPORT], reprinted in Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of
Review in State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1, 204-05 app. A (1990) (minority
report of ABA Task Force co-chairman Malcolm M. Lucas). Arguably, the precise contours
of Teague remain a bit hazy. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1280 (5th Cir. 1989)
(en banc); see also id. at 1305 (King, J., dissenting).
33. This attention has come from the Supreme Court, commentators, and Congress. See,
eg., McCleskey v. Zant, 111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991); A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 32 (reviewing and
commenting upon report and suggestions of the American Bar Association (ABA)); Vivian
Berger, Justice Delayed or Justice Denied?-A Comment on Recent Proposals to Reform Death
[Vol. 19:23
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by what is perceived to be an abuse of the legal system by lawyers repre-
senting inmates on death row.34 Nevertheless, the proposals offered to
date remain largely unresponsive to the problems delineated in this Arti-
cle-namely, the problems concerning the relationship between retroac-
tivity doctrine and inadequate trial counsel in capital cases.3" The
proposals offered here are designed to address both these features of the
current system. They are designed, in other words, not with the quixotic
aim of eliminating the death penalty altogether but with the hope of safe-
guatding the process by which we sentence citizens to death.
I. Teague, Its Progeny, and Retroactivity
Frank Teague, a black man, was convicted by an all-white jury of
attempted murder, armed robbery, and battery.36 The prosecutor used
all ten of his peremptory challenges to remove blacks from the jury
Penalty Habeas Corpus, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1665 (1990) (reviewing and commenting upon
ABA Report as well as recommendations of the Powell Commission); Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035 (1989).
34. See, e.g., Judge Jones' opinion in Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978, 985-86 (5th Cir.
1988) (Jones, J., specially concurring) (comparing behavior of petitioner's habeas counsel to
the behavior of petitioner himself, who raped and murdered his victim). Justice Scalia has also
recently expressed this concern over habeas counsel's so-called delay tactics. See Madden v.
Texas, 111 S. Ct. 902, 904-05 (1991) (Scalia, Circuit Justice).
35. With the exception of the recommendations of the ABA, the proposals that address
the problem of delay and protracted litigation in the death penalty context pay scarce atten-
tion, if any, to the fundamental problem of inadequate trial counsel. The ABA, however, most
certainly does recognize the centrality of this problem. Indeed, the ABA
is persuaded that the principal failings of the capital punishment review process to-
day are the inadequacy and inadequate compensation of counsel at trial and the un-
availability of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings....
... [I]f competent trial counsel were appointed initially and given the resources
to represent their clients properly, and if competent counsel represented petitioners
from the earliest stages of state post-conviction review, then the entire capital litiga-
tion process would be shortened, perhaps greatly so.
Competent and adequately compensated counsel from trial through collateral
review is thus the sine qua non of a just, effective, and efficient death penalty system.
A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 32, at 16-17 (citations omitted).
The central failure of the ABA proposals in this regard is .the unresponsiveness to the
method of selecting counsel to represent indigent capital defendants. I suggest below that the
problem of inadequate trial counsel is endemic in jurisdictions that lack public defender sys-
tems. Stressing the importance of effective counsel is terribly important, and the content of the
ABA recommendations in this regard cannot be overestimated. What we also need, however,
is a proposal for attaining such counsel.
One final difference in focus between the proposals offered in this Article and the ABA
suggestions is that the ABA paid little attention to the issue of retroactivity, primarily because
the impact of Teague v. Lane was not yet known at the time the ABA proposals were redacted.
Yet the spirit of the ABA Report can fairly be said to be squarely in line with the argument in
this Article. See id. at 50-52.
36. 489 U.S. at 292-93.
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panel.37 Arguably, the prosecutor removed the potential black jurors be-
cause they were black.38
Under what is known as the Batson doctrine,39 a prosecutor's use of
peremptory challenges to remove blacks because they are black may con-
stitute a denial of the defendant's constitutional guarantee of equal pro-
tection. In Batson v. Kentucky,' the Court delineated the evidentiary
showing that a defendant must make in order to prevail on this claim. A
defendant establishes a prima facie case under Batson by showing that (1)
"he is a member of a cognizable racial group," (2) the prosecution used
its "peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the
defendant's race," and (3) those "facts and other relevant circumstances
raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the
veniremen from the jury on account of their race."41 Once the prima
facie case is established, "the burden shifts to the State to come forward
with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors."
4 2
Under Batson, Frank Teague had a strong claim that he had been
denied equal protection. The problem is that Teague was convicted
before Batson was rendered. Under Swain v. Alabama,43 which Batson
overruled in part, Teague's trial passed constitutional muster. Moreover,
by the time Batson was decided, Teague's conviction had already become
final.' Teague argued in the collateral attack on his conviction that Bat-
son established that his due process rights had been abridged. But the
Court ruled that because Teague's conviction was already final at the
time of Batson, Teague could not avail himself of the Batson principle.45
To be clear: The Court did not pass on the merits of Teague's claim, nor
did it hold that the evidence was or was not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case under Batson. The Court simply held that it would not permit
Teague to raise the claim.
Imagine a different, hypothetical petitioner-one whose crime was
identical to Teague's, whose evidence at both the guilt-innocence and
trial phases was identical to Teague's, and who, like Teague, had been
convicted and sentenced to prison. This hypothetical defendant would
37. Id. at 293.
38. See id.
39. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986).
40. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
41. Id. at 96.
42. Id. at 97.
43. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
44. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 295. "Final" means that the judgment of conviction has been
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition of certiorari has
elapsed. See Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 258 n.1 (1986).
45. 489 U.S. at 295-96.
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be able to raise the Batson issue in a collateral attack on his conviction
either if his lawyer had preserved the issue and then persuaded the
Supreme Court to grant certiorari to consider it or if his conviction had
not become final until after Batson. If he had been wealthy and able to
afford a highly skilled lawyer, or had he been appointed a more compe-
tent lawyer, or if he had been fortunate enough to commit the crime in a
jurisdiction with public defenders, his lawyer might well have preserved
the issue, and sought and obtained review in the Supreme Court. Then
he, unlike Teague, would have been able to invoke the Batson principle.47
Furthermore, and perhaps even more remarkably, if the state appellate
court in the case of our hypothetical defendant had merely acted more
slowly, so that the United States Supreme Court had handed down Bat-
son before the state appellate court affirmed his conviction, he would
have been able to take advantage of the Batson rule.48
The importance of having a clever trial attorney is impossible to
gainsay. The element of pure chance plays a major, sometimes disposi-
tive, role in determining whether each criminal defendant will enjoy cer-
tain constitutional rights. This result is not an unintended ramification
of Teague. On the contrary, this is Teague v. Lane's very core: Certain
doctrines cannot be raised by habeas petitioners in collateral attacks on
their convictions if those doctrines were not articulated by the Supreme
Court until after the petitioner's conviction became final.49 Yet aside
from producing arbitrary results, as our hypothetical illustrates, Teague
also raises an important question: Which doctrines fall into this group
and therefore cannot be raised if they were not deemed claims until after
the petitioner's conviction became final?
A. Retroactivity from Linkletter Through Teague
For several decades the Court has wrestled with the issue of retroac-
tivity. The first explicit consideration of the issue seems to have been in
Linkletter v. Walker,50 which addressed the question of whether Mapp v.
46. Whether an issue is sufficiently preserved is a matter of state law. A nonpreserved
issue can be raised by way of a collateral habeas attack on the conviction only in limited
circumstances where the issue pertains to fundamental fairness.
47. It is perhaps important to point out that this hypothetical defendant is not genuinely
hypothetical, for at the same time that Teague was being tried, other defendants' lawyers were
raising this issue. See, eg., McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 961-63 (1983); id. at 966-67
(Marshall, J., with Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. Cf Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 436-37 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (making an
analogous argument in the Fourth Amendment context).
49. Teague, 489 U.S. at 295-96.
50. 381 U.S. 618, 628 n.13 (1965). Prior to Linkletter, although the Court as a whole had
not addressed this issue, individual Justices had expressed opinions concerning whether partic-
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Ohio" sshould be applied to cases that had become final before Mapp was
decided. Mapp overruled Wolf v. Colorado52 and held that evidence
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment must be excluded from
state criminal proceedings.53 The Linkletter Court reasoned that the
Constitution does not require that Supreme Court decisions be applied
retroactively, and it thus denied relief on the Mapp issue.5 4
Linkletter established a three-part balancing test for retroactive ap-
plication. 5 First, would the new rule's purpose be advanced by retroac-
tive application? Second, to what extent does the new rule rely on
precedent existing at the time the new rule was articulated? Third, what
effect would retroactive application have on the efficient administration
of justice? The Court used this test irrespective of whether the case was
before the Court on direct appeal or collateral review,56 and it produced
a series of somewhat ad hoe rulings.
57
ular newly recognized (or created) rules of criminal procedure ought to be given retroactive
effect. See, eg., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 439-40 (1964) (Harlan, J., joined by Clark
and Stewart, JJ., dissenting) (criticizing majority for refusing even to consider whether a newly
announced rule of criminal procedure ought to be applied retroactively); LaVallee v.
Durocher, 377 U.S. 998, 998 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (urging
that certiorari be granted to determine retroactive application of Gideon v. Wainright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963)); Norvell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 424-26 (1963) (Goldberg, J., joined by
Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that majority ignored the important issue of determining the
retroactive application of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)).
51. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
52. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
53. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
54. Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 639-40.
55. Id. at 636-37.
56. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 300 (1967) (concluding that no justifiable distinc-
tion exists between final convictions and eonvictions at various stages of trial and direct re-
view); cf. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 548-63 (1982) (utilizing retroactivity analysis
to determine whether Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), which prohibited warrantless,
non-consensual entry into suspect's home to make a felony arrest, should apply to arrests made
before announcement of the new rule).
57. See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1980) (giving retroactive effect to
a decision invalidating conviction of a non-petty criminal offense by a non-unanimous six-
person jury); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31, 33 (1975) (denying retroactive effect to a deci-
sion holding unconstitutional the exclusion of women from jury); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
278, 284-85 (1972) (plurality opinion) (denying retroactive effect to a decision guaranteeing
assistance of counsel at preliminary hearing). The period between Linkletter and Teague is
thoroughly covered by Ginger G. Mayer, Note, Retroactive Application of Constitutional Rules
Regarding Criminal Procedure, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1097, 1099-1111 (1988). See also James B.
Haddad, The Finality Distinction in Supreme Court Retroactivity Analysis: An Inadequate Sur-
rogate for Modification of the Scope of Federal Habeas Corpus, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1062, 1078-
79 (1985) (criticizing the inconsistency in the Linkletter line of cases and noting that Court's
true concern appears to be the prevention of collateral attacks on state con ictions on grounds
unrelated to guilt or innocence). The cluster of cases decided at or around the time of Teague
is amply discussed in Boshkoff, supra note 2.
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Indeed, Justice Harlan was displeased with the test almost from the
outset,58 and he therefore proposed an alternative in Mackey v. United
States59 that focused on two factors rather than three and that eschewed
the Linkletter balancing approach in favor of a yes-or-no analysis.
Harlan believed that new rules should be applied retroactively to all cases
on direct appeal and also to cases on collateral review when (1) the new
rule placed "certain kinds of primary, personal individual conduct be-
yond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe, '  or
(2) the new rule required the observance of procedures that are implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.6 1 An example of the first prong of the
Harlan test would be something like the abortion decision Roe v. Wade.62
Suppose that a certain doctor had been convicted of having performed an
abortion during the sixth week of pregnancy (the first trimester). Sup-
pose in addition that he had been sentenced to prison, his conviction had
become final, and he was in fact serving his term. Although his case
became final years before Roe, the Court in Roe placed the conduct of the
physician beyond the power of the state to proscribe.63 Therefore, under
the first prong of Harlan's proposed test, the doctor would be permitted
to use Roe v. Wade in a collateral attack on his conviction."
The second prong of Harlan's test is more difficult to fathom, and I
will discuss it further shortly.6" The point of immediate pertinence is
that the Teague Court purported to embrace the Harlan test.66
At the time that Frank Teague's case was before the Court on collat-
eral review, it was not clear what approach to retroactivity the Court
would use in such circumstances. The Court's approach was more lucid
in cases on direct appeal. Shortly before Teague came up, the Court had
jettisoned the Linkletter approach and applied Justice Harlan's analysis
in a case on direct appeal concerning the Batson issue.67 Then in Teague,
58. Initially Justice Harlan had supported Linkletter, but four years later, following the
emergence of an "extraordinary collection of rules" as a consequence of Linkletter, he capitu-
lated and proposed his alternative. Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256-69 (1969)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. 401 U.S. 667, 675-702 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
60. Id& at 692.
61. Id. at 693.
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. .d at 164-66.
64. For more on this primary conduct exception, see Justice Harlan's opinion in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-78 (1965).
65. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
66. 489 U.S. at 303-16.
67. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23 (1987) (applying Batson retroactively).
Following Harlan's view that there is a distinction of constitutional magnitude between cases
on direct appeal and those on collateral review, see, eg., Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244,
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the Court went a step further and applied the Harlan test to collateral
attacks. The Court held that Frank Teague could not benefit from Bat-
son.68 Teague therefore rests inextricably upon the Court's conclusion
that the Batson rule is not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. This
dispositive premise is neither necessarily nor self-evidently true. The
question therefore arises: How and why did the Court determine that the
Batson principle is not implicit in the concept of ordered liberty?
To discuss this question meaningfully a bit of background is needed.
In Allen v. Hardy,69 decided after Batson, the Court held that since Bat-
son had overruled a portion of Swain v. Alabama,7" it constituted a sub-
stantial break with precedent and would therefore not be applied
retroactively to convictions that became final before Batson was an-
nounced.71 The Allen Court used the Linkletter balancing test rather
than the Harlan analysis,7 2 and the two critical concepts on which Allen
rests are "substantial break" and "final." 73 The definition of the latter is
straightforward.74 Under the Linkletter approach a petitioner whose
conviction is final cannot take advantage of new doctrines if they amount
to a substantial break with precedent. Allen leaves us with the problem
of defining substantial break75-a concept that is not amenable to rigor-
258 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), the Court in Teague held that although retroactive applica-
tion is generally required in cases on direct review, see Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328, retroactive
application is the exception in cases on collateral review. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. Of course,
the issue of retroactivity arises only in the context of so-called new rules. If the rule is not
new-if it was in place already before the conviction became final-then no retroactivity
problems arise (though there may well be issues of procedural default). See Yates v. Aiken,
484 U.S. 211, 217-18 (1988).
68. 489 U.S. at 296.
69. 478 U.S. 255 (1986) (per curiam).
70. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
71. 478 U.S. at 258-59.
72. See supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
73. 478 U.S. at 258-60.
74. According to the Court, "final" is defined as a case "where the judgment of conviction
was rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had
elapsed." 478 U.S. at 258 n.l.
75. Teague's lawyer, and many others in his position, did not raise the Swain issue at trial
or on direct appeal. This is important because the Teague Court reaffirmed the holding in
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), that, as a matter of federal habeas law, unless the
petitioner can show cause for not raising the issue as well as prejudice resulting therefrom, it
cannot be raised in collateral attacks upon the conviction. Teague, 489 U.S. at 298 (O'Connor,
J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.). This area of doctrine is
known as procedural default. For an excellent analysis of the cases, and their relation to the
Court's test for ineffective assistance of counsel, see Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 681-90.
Another difficulty is the peculiarity of having the defendant pay for the Court's tardiness
in discovering the true meaning of the Constitution. Unless the petitioner falls within one of
two exceedingly narrow exceptions, that petitioner will lose if the Court's decision is deemed a
substantial break with precedent. But all these cases are constitutional cases. The Court is
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ous definition because it includes the modal adjective "substantial."
Justice Harlan's yes-or-no test, although arguably an improvement
over the Linkletter approach, does not circumvent this definitional diffi-
culty; in fact, it exacerbates it. Under the Harlan test, as we will see, the
same definitional problem arises at an earlier stage of the inquiry: during
the determination of whether the newly articulated constitutional princi-
ple is a "new" rule. Thus, when in Teague a plurality of the Court, com-
prising Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Chief Justice Rehnquist,
adopted Justice Harlan's test for determining whether a new rule would
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, the plurality also
adopted a test that would subsume rather than avoid the intractable
question of defining substantial break.
The Teague plurality proceeded to pose a second inscrutable ques-
tion as well. The Teague Court defined a "new rule" as a rule that
"breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the
Federal government."76 A case does so, the Court continued, whenever
"the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defend-
ant's conviction became final."" Notice that the Linkletter problem of
defining substantial break has simply reappeared with the very definition
of new rule. The rule is new if it "breaks new ground," if it was not
"dictated by precedent." These locutions appear to be indistinguishable
from the concept of "substantial break." The definitional problem inher-
ent in the Harlan test has not been circumvented; it has just been moved.
In any event, once a court finds a new rule, it can utilize the two
Harlan exceptions to the general bar against retroactive application and
apply the new rule retroactively to cases on collateral review only if the
new rule (1) precludes the state from outlawing certain conduct or (2)
requires the state to observe procedures that are implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty. Here we confront the second definitional conundrum:
the amorphous notion of "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."
The question whether a new rule is in fact implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty is a question that eludes definition just as steadfastly as
does the issue of "substantial break."78
saying what the Constitution requires. Hence, when the Court decrees a new rule but declares
it not applicable retroactively, it is penalizing the defendant for its own interpretive error.
76. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
77. Id (emphasis omitted).
78. This very point, of course, was made by Justice Black in the incorporation debate. See
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 69-90 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). The "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" language itself also has its origins in the incorporation debate. See
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (opinion of Cardozo, J.).
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To summarize, a new rule is one that breaks new ground, meaning
that it was not dictated at the time the petitioner's conviction became
final." It is defined, in other words, in terms parallel to the Linkletter
question of "substantial break." A case that constitutes a substantial
break with precedent would satisfy the Teague definition of new rule, and
vice versa. A new rule is simply one that represents a substantial break.
This leaves the issue of which new rules will be applied retroactively.
The Teague plurality, purporting to follow Justice Harlan's test, held
that of all the new rules in the constitutional universe, the ones that will
be applied retroactively are those that are implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.80
B. The Problem with Teague Generally
For reasons of common sense, Teague's juxtaposition of the critical
concepts "substantial break" and "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" is perplexing. A rule is "new" if it represents a substantial break
with precedent. Some substantial breaks are dictated because they repre-
sent principles that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. But if
the new procedures are genuinely implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty, how does it make any sense-any semantic sense-to call them
"new"? The term "implicit" suggests that the rule or procedure is al-
ready there (albeit hidden). Something is implicit when it is necessarily
present, when it is essential.81 Thus, although a newly articulated rule
might clearly constitute a substantial break with precedent, insofar as the
rule is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, then, unless the idea of
liberty has changed since the petitioner's conviction became final, the
rule was already constitutionally mandated at the time that the peti-
tioner's case became final.
The Teague plurality was apparently aware that, far from eliding the
definitional difficulties inherent in the Linkletter test, it had merely recast
them. Further, the Court seems to have recognized that by shifting to
the Harlan approach, it actually augmented the conceptual problems, for
79. See supra note 74. In addition, as I discuss below, in the aftermath of Butler, even
when there is only a very minor deviation from a previous case-some might say even when
there is no deviation at all-the definition of new rule will be satisfied.
Here it is appropriate to discuss the meaning of "deviation." Butler is not a deviation if
what we mean by deviation is "contradiction," for Butler does nothing that is at odds with
prior case law. Butler seems to indicate, however, that the Court also defines "deviation" as
"extension," which, as I argue in the text, is enormously problematic.
80. 489 U.S. at 311.
81. See WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 914 (2d ed.
1979). "Implicit" is also defined as "virtually or potentially contained in." 7 OXFORD ENG-
LISH DICTIONARY 724 (2d ed. 1989).
[Vol. 19.23
TEAGUE AND RETROACTIVITY
the Court was then forced to grapple as well with the "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" issue. To circumscribe this latter difficulty,
the Teague plurality, while nominally utilizing the Harlan test, held that
a new rule will have retroactive effect only if the denial to the petitioner
of the now-mandated procedure (the new rule) is deemed seriously to
affect the reliability of the conviction. 2 In other words, the Teague plu-
rality, faced with this definitional morass, defined "implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty" as tantamount to the reliability of the
conviction.
83
This is obviously a bizarre equation. It is therefore not surprising
that the central disagreement in Teague concerned the scope of the sec-
ond prong of the Harlan exception. Whereas the Teague plurality sug-
gested that Harlan's exceptions (or the second one at any rate) embrace
only those errors bearing on the determination of innocence or guilt, 4
Justice Stevens, in an opinion joined by Justice Blackmun, declined to so
limit the reach of the Harlan exceptions.8 5 In Stevens's view, "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty" has to do with "fundamental fairness,"
and fundamental unfairness is not necessarily limited to the ultimate
question of guilt or innocence.86
If we accept the distinction between substance and procedure, then
Justice Stevens's argument has ineluctable force. For despite the diffi-
culty in deciding what is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
what we mean by fundamental fairness, these terms must mean more
than the ultimate question of innocence or guilt, or else there is no reason
to preserve the substance-procedure distinction. The question of inno-
cence or guilt is precisely what we mean by substantive fairness; there-
fore, if procedural fairness as a separate category means anything, it must
mean something besides innocence or guilt. Stevens's argument is simply
unassailable here.
Moreover, even if we embrace the demise of the substance-proce-
dure distinction--even if we are willing to say that the only values we
care about are substantive and that therefore nothing is constitutionally
meaningful besides the issue of innocence versus guilt-the result in
82. 489 U.S. at 313.
83. In Teague, the plurality does not acknowledge that it has equated these two terms.
Instead, it seems to treat the second exception as having two requirements-implicitness and a
wrongful conviction. Id. at 311-15.
84. Id. at 313.
85. Id at 318-26 (Stevens, J., with Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
86. Id at 320-21.
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Teague still does not follow. It is on this latter point that I would like to
focus.
"Guilt" is a term of art. It does not mean that the defendant "did
it," for that statement would raise difficult, perhaps unanswerable, episte-
mological questions in many, though not all, cases. As Wittgenstein
argued:
'Knowledge' and 'certainty' belong to different categories. They
are not two 'mental states' like, say 'surmising' and 'being sure.'
(Here I assume that it is meaningful for me to say "I know what
(e.g.) the word 'doubt' means" and that this sentence indicates that
the word "doubt" has a logical role.) What interests us now is not
being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact
that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if
making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined
to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical
proposition is one.
87
The Supreme Court, in other words, has committed what the philoso-
pher Gilbert Ryle calls a category mistake; 8 it has confused "guilty"
with an empirical proposition. What we really mean by "guilt" is that a
jury of the defendant's peers believed beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did it.89 We never really know why the jury believed this, only
that it did (or that it did not).90 This is quite important. The jury is a
deliberative body.91 Some members of it will ascribe importance to cer-
87. LUDGWIG WITrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 39e, proposition 308 (G.E.M. Anscombe
& G.H. von Wright eds., 1969). See also id. at 2e, prop. 5 ("Whether a proposition can turn
out false after all depends on what I make count as determinants for that proposition."); id at
3e, prop. 8 ("The difference between the concept of 'knowing' and the concept of 'being cer-
tain' isn't of any great importance at all, except where 'I know' is meant to mean: I can't be
wrong. In a law-court, for example, 'I am certain' could replace 'I know' in every piece of
testimony."); id. at 12e, prop. 83 ("The truth of certain empirical propositions belongs to our
frame of reference."); id. at 72e, prop. 550 ("If someone believes something, we needn't always
be able to answer the question 'why he believes it'; but if he knows something, then the ques-
tion 'how does he know?' must be capable of being answered.").
88. GILBERT RYLE, THE CONCEPT OF MIND 16 (1949).
89. For a short discussion of the difficulty of quantifying how much proof satisfies the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard, see RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R. GARDNER,
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT: CASES, MATERIALS AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 9
(1989).
90. Even this conclusion is problematic and not quite accurate. All we really know is
what the jury did, which is to say we know the verdict is rendered. Concluding anything
beyond this puts us on treacherous ground.
91. This is especially meaningful in the death penalty context, where the decision of how
to punish a defendant found to be guilty is also subject to numerous influences. See William S.
Geimer & Jonathon Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote for Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten
Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 53 (1988); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are
Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 223-24
(concluding that deliberative process works well at sorting out the facts but not well at apply-
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tain factors; others will rely on entirely different variables. Some will
vote to convict, and properly so, even though they hold a scintilla of
doubt on the question of whether the defendant did it. This legal idea of
guilt is simply not the same as the question of whether the defendant
"did it," for the legal category acknowledges that in many cases it is, as a
matter of epistemology, impossible to answer with certainty the question
of whether he "did it." Given this epistemological limitation, the legal
system insists instead on reasonable certainty. Consequently, anything
that interferes with the system's analysis of the issue of reasonable certainty
does indeed bear, in a direct and inexorable manner, on the question of
innocence versus guilt. This is true whether the interference is procedural
or substantive.
The Teague plurality mistakenly believed that a single factor, or
even a limited set of particular factors, can be identified as the one or
several that determine the jury's conclusion on guilt or innocence. 92 This
is not ordinarily possible. The construction given to the second Harlan
exception by the Teague plurality therefore reflects, if nothing else, a
deeply flawed epistemology.93
C. The Special Problem with Teague in the Capital Context
In the capital context, where the jury not only finds guilt but also
sentences to death, this mistake is especially troubling. In Penry v.
Lynaugh,94 the Court specifically applied the Teague plurality's version
ing the law to the facts). See also Lawrence T. White, Juror Decision Making in the Capital
Penalty Trial, 11 LAW & HUMAN BEHAV. 113 (1987) (finding that penalty decision of mock
jurors was mediated by their perception of defendant's volition, future dangerousness, and
relative competence of the opposing attorneys). Notably, White found a significant tendency
among mock jurors to vote for the proposition advanced by the most able attorney. Id at 127.
Given the data presented below in Part II.C, this is an extraordinarily important finding.
92. An example of the seriousness of this error is the execution of Warren McCleskey.
Two jurors who voted to sentence McCleskey to death announced that they would not have
done so had they known that one of McCleskey's accusers was a police informant who, in
exchange for his testimony, had been offered a reduced sentence. See Peter Applebome, Man
Whose Appeals Shook the Courts Faces Execution, N.Y. TIMES (National), Sept. 24, 1991, at
A18. McCleskey was responsible for two major Supreme Court decisions, the first of which is
analyzed in Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARv. L. REv. 1388 (1988).
This same error, incidentally, is manifest in the Court's recent decision in the area of the
Fifth Amendment, holding that a coerced confession does not necessarily require the setting
aside of a guilty verdict if there is enough other evidence to support the conviction. Arizona v.
Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991).
93. In addition, many rules of criminal procedure, the exclusionary rule being the quintes-
sential example, positively undermine the truth-seeking enterprise. "Truth" with a capital "T"
is but one of several competing values.
94. 492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989).
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of the Harlan test to death penalty cases. This boded darkly for habeas
petitioners, and their worst fears were confirmed in subsequent cases, in-
cluding two that involved claims raised by death row inmates. In Saffle
v. Parks9 s and Butler v. McKellar,96 the Supreme Court applied Teague's
new rule analysis to deny habeas relief to petitioners who had been sen-
tenced to death.
In the Butler case, Horace Butler had been convicted and sentenced
in South Carolina.97 Butler had originally been arrested on suspicion of
assault and battery in a case unrelated to the murder he was subsequently
convicted of committing.98 In the context of the assault and battery in-
vestigation, Butler asked for a lawyer.9 9 Once he did, the police ceased
interrogating him on that case. While still in custody, however, Butler
became a suspect in the murder investigation. The police commenced
questioning him on that offense, and Butler confessed to the murder. 1°°
The issue presented in the collateral attack on his final murder conviction
was whether Butler's request for counsel in the context of the investiga-
tion for which he was originally arrested, the assault and battery charge,
forbade police from continuing to question him even in the context of a
different criminal investigation.
At the time Butler's case went to trial, there was Supreme Court
authority that would support a motion to suppress Butler's confession to
the murder.101 The motion to suppress is filed as a matter of course in
cases like Butler's, and in fact a motion to suppress was filed in Butler's
case. The trial court refused to grant it. Existing case law was not mani-
festly at odds with this decision, but neither was the trial court's decision
compelled by existing law. Eventually the Supreme Court refined the
law of confessions in a manner conducive to Butler's claim.' 2 Under
this refinement a decision to grant Butler's motion to suppress would
95. 110 S. Ct. 1257, 1259 (1990) (5-4 decision).
96. 110 S. Ct. 1212, 1214 (1990) (5-4 decision).
97. Id. at 1215. Virtually every Supreme Court opinion involving the death penalty re-
cites in gory detail the details of the crime for which the petitioner was convicted. See, eg.,
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307 (describing how the victim was brutally raped, beaten, and stabbed with
scissors). The reasons for doing this are not clear, since the grisly facts rarely bear on the legal
issues presented. The fact that the Court does this-the fact that it is able to do this-is
pertinent to a proposal I make below. See infra Part III.B, recommendation number 4.
98. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1214.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
102. Here the meaning of "deviation" is pivotal. See supra note 79. What several com-
mentators view as especially troubling about Butler is that there is simply no break with prece-
dent at all; there is just a new decision. I am especially grateful to Ronald Mann and Yale
Rosenberg for discussing with me at great length the Butler decision.
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have been compelled. Had Butler's case arisen several years after it did,
the outcome of the trial arguably would have been different. If Butler's
case had arisen later but his lawyer had failed to file the motion to sup-
press, or if the lawyer had filed the motion only to have it denied by the
trial court, Butler would have had a stronger argument for relief than he
had. Given the temporal dimension of the actual case, however, Butler's
lawyer would have had to have been prescient, in the true sense of the
word, to raise the suppression issue and articulate it in a way that would
cause the Supreme Court to grant certiorari.
10 3
Subsequent to Butler's final conviction, a different lawyer in a differ-
ent case had been sufficiently prescient. In Arizona v. Roberson,"° the
Court held that once a suspect requests counsel, police can no longer
question the suspect even in the context of a separate investigation. This
holding would have provided the authority Butler's counsel needed to
suppress his confession, for Butler's confession had been obtained under
circumstances largely indistinguishable from those in Roberson. Indeed,
had Roberson been decided prior to Butler, it is difficult to imagine that
Butler's lawyer would not have been deemed ineffective for failing to file
a motion to suppress.
In order to ascertain whether Butler should receive the benefit of
Roberson, the first step is to determine whether Roberson constitutes a
new rule, that is, whether it represents a substantial break with prece-
dent."0 If Roberson does constitute a new rule, then Butler may raise it
in a collateral attack on his conviction only if it falls within one of Justice
Harlan's two exceptions to the general bar against retroactive application
of new rules.
10 6
Following this analysis, the Butler Court first observed that Rober-
son had announced a new rule. 07 The Court explained that the doctrine
established by Roberson was not "dictated by precedent" existing when
Butler's conviction became final.108 In Butler's case, aside from broader
doctrinal issues, his assertion that the Roberson rule was not a new rule
should certainly have prevailed in view of the fact that the Court itself
103. In fact, it could plausibly be said that a lawyer practicing in this area would not have
needed to be a genius at all to anticipate Arizona v. Roberson, discussed below.
104. 486 U.S. 675, 677-78 (1988).
105. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218. In Butler, the way the Court phrased the issue was whether
Roberson was "dictated by precedent." This followed the plurality opinion in Teague, in
which Justice O'Connor used this phrasing. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
106. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
107. 110 S. Ct. at 1218.
108. Although this observation seems correct, its relevance is not clear. Whatever the diffi-
culty of defining "substantial break," it surely cannot mean what the Court implies by using
the "dictated by precedent" analysis.
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said in announcing Roberson that the rule it there articulated was not
new.1" Nevertheless, Butler's assertion did not prevail, apparently be-
cause the Court's own pronouncement is sometimes not determinative on
the new rule issue.110 This is simply extraordinary.
Remarkably, the Butler Court seems to have concluded that the def-
inition of a new rule-the formative definitional problem posed by the
retroactivity issue-is satisfied whenever reasonable judges might differ
on the ultimate legal issue. Because the trial court could have granted
Butler's motion to suppress, and because it could also have denied the
motion (which it did), any rule would be "new." The Court equated a
new rule with one not dictated by precedent, and it announced that the
rule is not dictated by precedent if reasonable legal minds might differ.1"'
This means, as Justice Brennan's dissent recognized, that the new rule
hurdle will always be surmounted." 2 On how many issues of constitu-
tional procedure are reasonable legal minds even close to unanimous?
Every rule will satisfy this test, so every rule will be regarded as new.
The "new-ness" prong of the analysis thus turns out not truly to be a
prong at all, but merely a chimerical hurdle.
The remaining question, therefore, is whether to apply the new rule
retroactively.113 The first prong of the Harlan exception 14 was of no
avail to Butler, for the Court in Roberson did not place certain primary
conduct beyond the power of the State to prohibit.115 The issue in Butler
v. McKellar, therefore, concerned the second Harlan exception. The
question was whether the rule announced in Roberson was "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty." This very question underlaid the disa-
greement in Teague, and it continued to be divisive in Butler. In a sense,
any jurist claiming to be a strict constructionist must perforce answer
109. See Roberson, 486 U.S. at 677 (Court couches its decision as a refusal to craft an
exception to the rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)). As Professor
Wright has observed, Butler represents "a very drastic extension of the principle of Teague."
Letter from Charles A. Wright, Professor, University of Texas, to Ronald J. Mann, Solicitor
General's Office of the United States (Mar. 26, 1990) (on file with author).
110. See Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18. In rejecting Butler's claim that Roberson did not
establish a new rule, the Court noted that Teague and Penry adequately defined the test for a
new rule (namely, the rule is new if it was "'not dictated by precedent existing at the time the
defendant's conviction became final' "). Id at 1216 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 314, and
Teague, 489 U.S. at 301) (emphasis omitted).
111. 110 S. Ct. at 1217-18.
112. Id at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
113. The issue of retroactivity is defined after Teague in the epistemologically incoherent
terms of guilt versus innocence.
114. This exception is illustrated above in the discussion of Roe v. Wade. See supra notes
62-64 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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this question affirmatively,"1 6 but that would mean that every new rule
would be applied retroactively. Consequently, the Court in Butler, im-
mediately after posing the question in the manner that Harlan had posed
it, answered a different question, the question that in Teague it had
equated with Harlan's inquiry. The Court held that Roberson would not
be extended retroactively to Butler's conviction because the fact that But-
ler himself did not enjoy the benefit of Roberson did not "seriously dimin-
ish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate determination."
' 117
As it had done in Teague, the Court in Butler defined the elusive
notion of "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" as coterminbus with
the issue of innocence versus guilt. The Court offered neither authority
nor reason to support this equation. In addition, Justice Harlan himself
never seems to have embraced this contorted exegesis of his test. Never-
theless, this spin first given to the Harlan test by the Teague plurality was
again embraced by the Butler majority.118
Butler epitomizes the epistemological error that animates the
Teague approach. It is simply not possible to say what the jury in But-
ler's case would have done had his confession been suppressed.11 9 In
116. The reason, as indicated above, is that if it is not implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, then where does it come from? See Teague, 489 U.S. at 312 (expressing concern that
application of the "implicit in ordered liberty test" alone would do little more than import
incorporation debate into the retroactivity decisions).
117. Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. In view of the Butler majority's focus on innocence versus guilt, it is somewhat pecu-
liar that the Court's actual decision in Butler concentrated not on the guilt-innocence issue but
instead on the nature of the new rule announced in Roberson. The Court's treatment of the
guilt-innocence question altogether neglected to examine why the jury might have found as it
did.
Justice Brennan's dissent in Butler, joined by Justice Marshall and in part by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens, charged that the Court in Teague had "dramatically restructur[ed]
retroactivity doctrine." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Noting that the distinction between new
rules and rules prevailing at the time of conviction is "far from sharp," Brennan lamented that
as a consequence of the Butler Court's explication of Teague a prisoner could secure habeas
relief only by showing that the state court's rejection of the constitutional challenge was "so
clearly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that the decision could not be defended by
any reasonable jurist." Id. at 1219 (emphasis in original).
119. There might be some debate as to whether the question posed in the text is the appro-
priate question. Perhaps the focus ought to be on the reliability of the confession, since this
seems more closely connected to the issue of actual guilt (i.e., whether the defendant actually
did it). If this latter question is the appropriate one, it surely merits emphasis that confessions
are notoriously unreliable. See Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 488-89 (1964) (observing
that "a system of criminal law-enforcement which comes to depend upon the confession will,
in the long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on
extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful investigation"); Haynes v. Washing-
ton, 373 U.S. 503, 519 (1963) (recognizing that confessions have often been extorted in order
to save the police the trouble of obtaining other evidence); George E. Dix, Texas Confession
Law and Oral Self-Incriminating Statements, 41 BAYLOR L. REv. 1 (1989) (noting that origin
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addition, Butler demonstrates the premium that the Teague doctrine
places upon defense counsel's creativity.120 But it would have been sur-
prising if Butler's own lawyer had possessed such creativity. Butler was
arrested and tried in South Carolina. Rather than rely upon court-ap-
pointed lawyers 12 -who, by virtue of niggardly compensation, often per-
form poorly even if they are competent l 22 -Butler hired his own lawyer,
the only attorney he knew.123 Capital defendants are usually poor,124
and Butler was no exception, which is why he was able to pay only $300
for his lawyer. 25 He got what he paid for. His lawyer's performance has
been generously characterized as "worse than bad."' 126 For reasons com-
mon to other jurisdictions that lack public defender systems for assigning
counsel to indigent capital defendants, lawyers assigned to represent indi-
gent defendants in South Carolina, or hired by them individually, are
rarely stellar and often dismal. Butler's lawyer was marginally compe-
tent at best, and if the allegations in the habeas petition are even half
true, he was not quite that. 27 Butler lost the benefit of Roberson, in large
part, because his lawyer did not have the prescience to see that the
of confession law was to prevent inaccurate convictions based on unreliable confessions);
Robin Simpson, Confessions--Their Reliability, 56 MEDIcO-LEGAL J. 125 (1988). See gener-
ally Irene M. Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, In the Beginning: The Talmudic Rule Against
Self-Incrimination, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv. 955 (1988) (arguing for a per se rule against use of
confessions).
120. Because neither Horace Butler's trial counsel nor his appellate counsel envisaged the
new rule, and did not therefore raise and have certiorari granted with respect to the claim that
the Supreme Court would adopt in Roberson, Horace Butler was not permitted to avail himself
of it. For want of a more creative lawyer-for want of the lawyer whom Roberson was lucky
enough to secure-Butler could have died at the hands of the state. (Furthermore, it merits
emphasis that anticipating Roberson did not exactly require great genius. See supra note 103
and accompanying text.)
Remarkably, Butler got relief from the South Carolina Supreme Court on a successor
petition. Butler v. State, 397 S.E.2d 87, 88 (S.C. 1990) (granting relief because of judge's
warning in open court that jury would likely hold Butler's failure to testify against him).
121. See infra Part II.C. Although the data from South Carolina consist entirely of esti-
mates, they are suggestive nonetheless.
122. See infra Parts II.B, II.C.
123. Petition for Habeas Corpus at 36, Butler v. State, 397 S.E.2d 87 (S.C. 1990) [hereinaf-
ter Petition for Habeas Corpus].
124. See Julius Debro et al., Death Row Inmates.: A Comparison of Georgia and Florida
Profiles, CRIM. JUST. REv., Spring 1987, at 41, 45 (describing similar profiles of Georgia and
Florida death row inmates, most of whom were young, undereducated, underemployed, eco-
nomically deprived, working class, recidivist offenders).
125. Interview with John Blume, habeas counsel for Butler (Feb. 22, 1991). The lawyer
who represented Butler at trial, W. McAlister Hill, had not previously tried a murder case.
Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 123, at 7.
126. Interview with John Blume, habeas counsel for Butler (Feb. 22, 1991).
127. This is not to say or imply that counsel is not highly competent in the areas more
familiar to and traversed by him. He is simply not a criminal lawyer.
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Supreme Court would eventually articulate the rule it did articulate in
Roberson.
128
Saffle v. Parks,129 decided the same day as Butler, also applied
Teague to a capital case. A jury sentenced Robyn Leroy Parks to death
after it was instructed at the penalty phase of the trial to avoid any influ-
ence of sympathy.130 This instruction arguably violated Parks' Eighth
Amendment protection. Parks argued that Lockett v. Ohio.3 and Ed-
dings v. Oklahoma,'32 both of which were decided before his conviction
became final, dictated that jurors be permitted to consider their sympa-
thy for the defendant as a mitigating factor in assessing punishment.
Parks also relied on California v. Brown,'33 which was decided after his
conviction became final. The Court rejected Parks's argument by focus-
ing on Lockett and Eddings, concluding that they did not dictate the rule
sought by Parks. "34 The Court then intimated that California v. Brown
would not help Parks either,13 but it did not thoroughly pursue this
argument, holding instead that because "Brown itself was decided nearly
four years after Parks' conviction became final," Parks could not benefit
from Brown without first establishing "that the decision in Brown did not
create a new rule." '136 In the Court's view, it did create a new rule, and
Parks could thus not resort to it without first establishing that it fell
within one of the two Harlan exceptions to the general rule barring retro-
active application of new rules.
Proceeding to that issue, the Court initially observed that the puta-
tive new rule failed to satisfy the first exception, pertaining to the
128. See Petition for Habeas Corpus, supra note 123, at 22-36 (describing Butler's lawyer's
failure to have any mental health evaluation conducted or to present any mitigating evidence
concerning Butler's background). If, for example, any mental health investigation had been
carried out, the jury might have learned that Butler is mentally retarded, id at 24, has organic
brain damage, id at 27, and is schizophrenic, id at 28. Butler was raised in dire poverty, and
during his childhood, rats invaded his home and "gnawed on the children in their sleep." Id
at 31.
129. 110 S. Ct. 1257 (1990) (5-4 decision).
130. Id at 1259.
131. 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (plurality opinion) (requiring that jury be permitted to con-
sider mitigating circumstances in capital cases).
132. 455 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1982) (prohibiting trial judge, when sentencing in capital cases,
from disregarding mitigating evidence proffered by defendant).
133. 479 U.S. 538, 539 (1987) (5-4 decision) (upholding instruction informing jurors that
they must not be swayed by mere sentiment, sympathy, or prejudice during penalty phase of
capital trial).
134. 110 S. Ct. at 1261.
135. See id. at 1263 (observing that in California v. Brown, the Court had held that anti-
sympathy instruction did not violate Eighth Amendment).
136. Id at 1263.
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criminalization of protected conduct.137 Next the Court considered
whether the new rule was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty-the
gist of the second exceptionl 3 8-and it held that that exception also was
not satisfied.139 Again the Court avoided the question of what "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" actually means, and it attended in-
stead, as it had in Butler, to the relationship between the new rule and
the question of innocence versus guilt. Conceding that the "contours of
this [second Harlan] exception may be difficult to discern,"' the Court
decided that the new rule established by Brown was not a watershed rule
of criminal procedure that undercut the accuracy of Parks' trial.141 The
soundness of the jury's determination, the Court reasoned, is "more
likely to be threatened than promoted by a rule allowing the sentence to
turn not on whether the defendant, in the eyes of the community, is mor-
ally deserving of the death sentence, but on whether the defendant can
strike an emotional chord in a juror."142
This statement utterly ignores the relationship between emotion and
the concept of desert. 143 There is no necessary contradiction between the
ability of a defendant to strike an emotional chord in the jury, on the one
hand, and the question of whether the defendant is "morally deserving"
of death, on the other. Indeed, of the numerous justifications for punish-
ment,14 only deterrence is purely rational.145 Every other justification is
137. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
139. 110 S. Ct. at 1263-64.
140. Id. at 1264.
141. Again, remarkably, the Court altogether neglected to examine the reasons why the
jury might have acted as it did.
142. 110 S. Ct. at 1264.
143. See generally RICHARD LEMPERT & JOSEPH SANDERS, AN INVITATION TO LAW
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE: DESERT, DISPUTES AND DISTRIBUTION 42-59 (1986) (arguing that
determination of just desert depends on depth at which adjudication occurs). Because an anti-
sympathy instruction might tend to dissuade jurors from perceiving the uniqueness of the de-
fendant's crime and from making serious inquiries about the defendant's upbringing and per-
sonal history, such an instruction would seem to permit, if not encourage, shallow
adjudication. See id. at 45-51; see also IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF
JUSTICE 102 (John Ladd trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1965) (1797) (concluding that legal justice re-
quires that all murderers be executed, "so that everyone will duly receive what his actions are
worth"); DAVID D. RAPHAEL, MORAL JUDGMENT 75 (1957) (embracing Mosaic principle
that degree of punishment called for depends on degree of injury visited on others).
144. See, eg., JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); PHILO-
SOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT (Gertrude Ezorsky ed., 1972); THEORIES OF PUN-
ISHMENT (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971); Gerald Gardiner, The Purposes of Criminal
Punishment, 21 MOD. L. REV. 117 (1958).
145. In Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976), however, the Court made it clear




connected, either directly or more tenuously, to some (for lack of a better
word) emotional factor."4 This is largely what punishment is. 147 To say
that these factors have no part in the assessment of punishment ignores
what juries do.' 4 8
Furthermore, the Court's conclusion and analysis in Parks again
rest upon the problematic supposition that we have the ability to isolate a
particular factor as irrelevant to the jury's assessment of guilt and its
determination of the appropriate sentence.'49 Finally, Robyn Parks pays
the price for having received a lawyer less creative and less prescient than
Albert Brown's. 150
The Teague line of cases, in sum, has desiccated the very essence of
the great writ.151 These cases demonstrate two fundamental errors that
are especially insidious in the capital context, where any slip can prove
fatal. First, they mistakenly assume that it is possible to locate individual
factors that caused the jury to act in a certain way. The translation of
the second Harlan exception into a question of guilt or innocence derives
entirely from this mistake. 152 Second, the Teague line of cases not only
creates a situation in which the defendant's enjoyment of certain consti-
tutional rights turns on whether the defendant had a creative lawyer; it
also seems oblivious to the -very premium that is now placed on innova-
tive lawyering at the trial level.
146. See Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARv. L. REV.
1662, 1665 & n.13 (1986) (noting conflicting and inconclusive data on question of deterrence).
147. Professor West has a slightly different, but no less caustic, critique. In her view, Saffle
v. Parks moves beyond Butler by holding that even when the petitioner's argument does not
rely at all on cases decided after his conviction became final, the argument itself is not available
if it would constitute a new rule. See Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104
HARV. L. REV. 43, 56, 58 (1990) (discussing Saffle v. Parks).
148. This point is further evidenced by the recent decision to allow the jury at the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital trial to consider testimony from the victim's family. See Payne v. Ten-
nessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
149. See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
150. Albert Brown is the petitioner in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
151. See, eg., Yale L. Rosenberg, Kaddish for Federal Habeas Corpus, 59 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 362 (1991) (concluding that Teague line of cases has eviscerated the great writ even
though Supreme Court has not forthrightly acknowledged its demise).
152. One can accept the gist of the Harlan test, I think, without treating it as the Court has.
Decisions pertaining to criminal procedure can be seen as falling on a spectrum-from water-
shed to trivial. In this regard, Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), is surely fundamen-
tal (or watershed), whereas Roberson is trivial. Batson would fall somewhere in between.
The normative question of whether one should receive or lose the benefit of any rule, be it
fundamental or trivial, merely by virtue of the fortuity of the lawyer's skill, is a separate mat-
ter. It does not bear on the premise of the Harlan test, which premise is simply that these rules
can indeed be categorized and placed on a spectrum of relative importance.
I am again extremely grateful to Ronald Mann for long discussions concerning the Harlan
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Under the current habeas corpus doctrine, habeas counsel is con-
strained not merely by the law existing at the time the petitioner's con-
viction became final, but also by the quality of lawyering that the
petitioner had received up until the time the conviction became final.
The absence of prescience among trial counsel is nearly impossible to
overcome on collateral appeals. This is the central doctrinal blindness of
the Teague line of cases.' 5 3 The radical significance of this myopia can-
not be comprehended without lingering over the quality of counsel in the
typical capital case, something that neither the Court nor the hopeful
reformers of the habeas system seem to have done.
II. What We Mean When We Talk About Incompetence
At least two Justices of the Supreme Court (four prior to the depar-
ture of Justices Brennan and Marshall),15 4 and numerous commenta-
tors, 5 5 view the Teague line of cases as having eviscerated the great writ.
Of course, it may be within Congress' purview to overrule156 Teague and
its progeny, though with a general population cowering in fear due to a
153. I am not suggesting that better trial attorneys are less trapped by Teague and current
retroactivity doctrine; good lawyers are every bit as affected as are poor lawyers. Instead, my
argument is that precisely because current retroactivity doctrine is so unreceptive to a habeas
petitioner's claims, it is all the more important that trial counsel be highly effective, i.e., sub-
stantially more effective than is called for under Strickland. Put differently, a criminal defend-
ant whose trial counsel was good is simply far less dependent on collateral review than is a
defendant whose lawyer was bad, which means that the real impact of Teague and its progeny
is on defendants who had the poorest lawyers.
154. Two sitting Justices can be said with certainty to feel this way. The views of Justices
Souter and Thomas on this question remain unknown. See, eg., Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct.
1257, 1264-65 (1990) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting)
(arguing, inter alia, that definition of "new rule" is fundamentally incompatible with the pur-
pose of habeas corpus).
155. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 151, at 378; West, supra note 147, at 58; Joseph L.
Hoffman, Retroactivity and the Great Writ: How Congress Should Respond to Teague v. Lane,
1990 B.Y.U. L. Rnv. 183; John J. Curtin, Jr., The Great Writ: Habeas in the '90s, A.B.A. J.,
Mar. 8, 1991, at 8. In fact, my colleague Yale Rosenberg has over the years detailed the steady
demise of the great writ. See, eg., Yale L. Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus:
From Great Writ to Exceptional Remedy, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 597 (1985) [hereinafter
Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus]; Yale L. Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia:
Procedural Defaults By Reasonably Incompetent Counsel, 62 MINN. L. REV. 341 (1978) [here-
inafter Rosenberg, Jettisoning Fay v. Noia]. See generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977);
Charles A. Wright, Habeas Corpus: Its History and Its Future, 81 MICH. L. REv. 802 (1983);
Larry W. Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1985)..
156. For rules pertaining to federal habeas corpus procedure, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256
(1991).
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soaring crime rate,'57 it is unlikely that Congress will be so bold.158 In
addition, given the obscurity of the data presented below, there is little
reason for Congress to act. The evil is not both blatant and egregious,
the combination that is ordinarily required before reform is undertaken.
Nevertheless, irrespective of the consequences of the new rule doctrine in
other areas of criminal law, its ramifications in the capital context are
truly pernicious. The lawyers who represent indigent capital defendants
are not worse than the lawyers who represent indigent rapists or armed
robbers or car thieves; the point is that they are just as bad. The stakes,
however, are much greater.
A. Strickland-Why Bad Isn't Bad Enough
We have seen that under Teague and its progeny a rule is catego-
rized as new if it was not dictated by precedent at the time the peti-
tioner's conviction became final. Hence, a petitioner whose conviction is
already final at the time the new rule is articulated can benefit from it
only if it satisfies one of the two Harlan exceptions. In light of the spin
given by the current Court to the Harlan exceptions, this means that the
petitioner can benefit from the new rule only if there is a serious likeli-
hood that it would have led to a different verdict-a serious likelihood,
that is, that the defendant is innocent.
159
Aside from the philosophical nonsense of this doctrine,"6 it means
as a practical matter that the petitioner's trial counsel must somehow
have preserved an argument that had not yet been recognized at the time
of trial, and the lawyer must then persuade the Supreme Court to grant
157. See Allen E. Liska & William Baccaglini, Feeling Safe by Comparison: Crime in the
Newspapers, 37 Soc. PRoBs. 360 (1990) (reviewing various surveys showing that a high per-
centage of the U.S. population fears crime and that this percentage is increasing).
158. In fact, with the Senate's passage of the Habeas Corpus Reform Act of 1991, S. 1241,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), Congress is poised to "insulate virtually all state convictions from
federal habeas review." Letter from Sara-Ann Determan, Steering Committee Chair, ABA
Postconviction Death Penalty Representation Project, to Volunteer Lawyers Representing
Death Row Inmates 1 (Aug. 5, 1991) (on fie with author).
The version of the crime bill passed by the House is nearly as draconian, but it does
modify the holding of Teague. Although the House proposal requires that habeas petitions be
filed within one year following the date that the conviction becomes final (an arguably uncon-
stitutional requirement), it defines "new rule" as a "clear break from precedent." H.R. 3371,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). At the time of Congress' winter adjournment, no compromise
had yet been reached.
159. The language in the text might be a bit of a fudge, since "different verdict" and "inno-
cent" are not necessarily the same thing. But it does seem to me that, taken as a whole,
Teague, Butler, and Parks equate these terms.
160. See supra Part I.B.
Fall 19911 TZAGUE AND RETROACTIVrTY
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
certiorari on this issue under the facts of the case.161 Given the virtual
impossibility of securing retroactive application of new rules in collateral
appeals, the only hope for capital defendants is that they receive a sen-
tence less than death or that their trial lawyers preserve an issue, even
though that issue is not yet delineated. For economic and structural rea-
sons, however, attorneys representing capital defendants at the trial and
direct appeal stage are rarely so ingenious.
Far more troubling is that lawyers who represent capital defendants
are often shy not only of brilliance but also of competence. 162 They are
not sufficiently incompetent, however, to satisfy the Supreme Court's test
for violation of criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment guarantees to ef-
fective counsel. The data presented below in Part II.C are highly sugges-
tive in this regard, and the discrete episodes recounted in Part II.B are
nearly incredible. Taken as a whole, this information indicates that the
problem of inadequate legal representation at the trial stage is endemic in
jurisdictions that rely on court-appointed lawyers to represent indigent
capital defendants. "Inadequate," however, does not mean "ineffective."
In fact, in every case illustration offered below, the legal test for incompe-
tence was not satisfied. 6 The ineptitude was not enough to violate the
Sixth Amendment."'
Under Strickland v. Washington,6 ' an attorney's failure to raise a
claim constitutes ineffectiveness only if (1).the error fell below a certain
standard (far below brilliance), and (2) the error is likely to have affected
the outcome."6 According to the Strickland Court, the petitioner is re-
161. See, eg., Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 682-83 n.15; see also Ruthann Robson &
Michael Mello, Ariadne's Provisions: A "Clue of Thread" to the Intricacies of Procedural De-
fault, Adequate and Independent State Grounds, and Florida's Death Penalty, 76 CAL. L. REV.
89 (1988); David J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 -ARv. L. REV. 1130
(1986); Bruce S. Ledewitz, Procedural Default in Death Penalty Cases: Fundamental Miscar-
riage of Justice and Actual Innocence, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 379 (1988). On procedural default
itself, see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
162. See Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 20, at 30, 42. This gap between the level of counsel
guaranteed by Strickland and the level seemingly demanded by the law pertaining to proce-
dural default has been examined, in an argument that parallels the one I make here, by my
colleague Yale Rosenberg. See Rosenberg, Constricting Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note
155, at 614-23.
163. In several of the instances, the issue is still in litigation.
164. My basic argument, as discussed earlier, is that there is an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion-because the punishment is "unusual"--when there is a departure from the principle of
comparative justice. Inept lawyers, while not sinking to the level of ineffectiveness under
Strickland's Sixth Amendment standard, nonetheless abridge this Eighth Amendment value.
165. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
166. The second prong mirrors the epistemological error of the Teague Court's delineation
of the second Harlan exception, since this is a literally unknowable counterfactual. Actually,
this fallacy can be said to be present in the very idea of harmless error. This is a large topic
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quired to show that "but for" the lawyer's error(s), there is a "reasonable
probability that.., the result... would have been different." 16 7 Either
prong, standing alone, would be onerous; together, they are virtually in-
surmountable.' 68 Ironically, Strickland itself was a capital case. The
Court, in rejecting the allegation of ineffectiveness, reasoned that the trial
counsel's strategy at the punishment phase of the trial "probably" did
not result in prejudice. 16 9
The standard set by the first prong of the Strickland test is ex-
tremely hard for the petitioner challenging his lawyer's competence to
satisfy, in part because the Court indulges in a "strong presumption"
that the lawyer was competent. 170 This presumption stems either from
disingenuousness or from a lack of knowledge.' 7' Supreme Court Jus-
tices hear tales, but they are probably not personally familiar with the
ineptitude that abounds in capital trials. Presumably they read about it
in transcripts, but they are perhaps justifiably skeptical given the ubiquity
of ineffectiveness challenges. Virtually every death row habeas petitioner
argues that his lawyer was constitutionally ineffective.' 72 Not all of these
lawyers are inept, but the truth is that a great many are shockingly dis-
mal, which makes the Strickland presumption preposterous. This is es-
pecially so, I will argue, in jurisdictions lacking public defender systems.
that is not immediately germane, but I should mention that I do not believe that accepting my
argument necessarily entails a rejection of the idea of harmless error, though it might suggest
that only de minimis issues can be treated under the harmless error approach.
167. 466 U.S. at 694.
168. See, e.g., People v. Gaines, 473 N.E.2d 868 (in. 1984) (in which Illinois Supreme
Court, following Strickland, held that defense attorney's failure to present mitigating evidence
at sentencing phase of capital trial did not necessarily prejudice defendant); Gary Goodpaster,
The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 59, 73 (1986) (arguing that strong presumption of compe-
tence afforded under Strickland test makes ineffectiveness claims difficult to establish as a mat-
ter of law); see also Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional
Claims in Capital Cases Due to Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92 W. VA.
L. REv. 679, 683 (1990) (concluding that counsel's failure to preserve a constitutional viola-
tion due to negligence, ignorance, or incompetence will still not rise to Strickland's ineffective-
ness standard).
169. 466 U.S. at 698-99.
170. d at 690-91.
171. See supra note 6.
172. Former Chief Justice Burger angered the bar when he announced publicly that some
half of the lawyers who represent criminal defendants are unsatisfactory. See Rosenberg, Jet-
tisoning Fay v. Noia, supra note 155, at 436-37 n.389 (1978) (citing Warren Burger, The Spe-
cial Skills ofAdvocacy, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 234 (1973)). Burger was speaking of what
he had heard, not what he had seen. One must hope that the jurists who indulge in the pre-
sumption of competence when evaluating Strickland claims are unaware of this widespread
incompetence.
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Furthermore, although the petitioner will be challenging particular
acts and omissions committed by the lawyer, the Strickland test per-
versely looks at the lawyer's conduct as a whole.1 73 Even the worst law-
yer, however, does some things, indeed many things, competently. By
evaluating the lawyer's entire performance, particular errors, even if
egregious, can be effectively overlooked-buried in the context of the
overall performance. In a recent article concerning procedural default in
capital cases, Professors Jeffries and Stuntz aptly characterize the Strick-
land standard as one that "approximates gross negligence."' 74 In the
United States, therefore, under the Constitution, a person can be exe-
cuted if his lawyer performed at a level a scintilla above gross negli-
gence. 175  Many lawyers representing indigent capital defendants are
performing, at best, at precisely that level.
B. What Bad Is-Stories of the System
Examples abound of appalling behavior by lawyers representing
capital defendants. 176 The lawyers, however, deserve only part of the
blame; the system itself is vitiated. Specifying the reasons for this sys-
temic ailment requires hazardous conjecture, but among the plausible
factors are that judges are often elected in states with death penalty
laws 7 7 and that states are loathe to spend tax dollars to defend accused
killers. 178 For example, Louisiana executed a man represented at trial by
173. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (holding that in cases presenting an ineffectiveness
challenge, "the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable con-
sidering all the circumstances") (emphasis added).
174. Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 682.
175. Curiously, despite their observation that "criminal defendants are often bound by the
mistakes of their lawyers" as a result of current doctrine, id at 683, a consequence that Profes-
sors Jeffries and Stuntz characterize as "hard to justify," id., the authors nonetheless tailor
their reforms to protect the "arguably innocent." Id. at 691. Their proposal is thus subject to
the same philosophical critique of Teague, see supra Part I.B, as are several other proposals
discussed below in Part IIl.
176. See, eg., Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 20 (quoting closing argument of defense counsel
who told jury that he had searched his mind for a possible defense in face of all the evidence
pointing toward guilt); Marianne Lavelle, A Different Approach, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at
34 (describing how defense lawyer in Texas referred to his client as a "wetback" during voir
dire).
177. This is true in Texas, for example, the state with the largest death row population, and
also in California, with the nation's second largest death row population. See infra note 238.
The significance of having judges elected is that they then become more directly subject to
majoritarian pressures, and studies show that the American population strongly favors capital
punishment. See infra note 218.
178. Both these factors seem to have combined in a recent high-profile capital murder case
in Texas, in which Carl Wayne Buntion was tried for capital murder for killing a policeman.
Buntion's lead lawyer, J. Philip Scardino, received $17,500 for defending Buntion. (Scardino's
co-counsel, John Kiernan, received $11,337.) Scardino had requested more than twice the sum
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a court-appointed lawyer who could receive a maximum of $1000. At
fifty 'dollars an hour-less than large firms bill for the work of their
paralegals-Louisiana provided this capital defendant with twenty hours
of legal assistance.179
Louisiana is not unique in this regard. 180 In Alabama, attorneys
appointed to represent capital defendants receive forty dollars an hour
for time in the courtroom and twenty dollars an hour for out-of-court
trial preparation. Because the ceiling for out-of-court time is $1000, Ala-
bama is in effect giving lawyers for capital defendants only fifty hours to
get a case ready for trial. Georgia too pays twenty dollars an hour for
out-of-court time (with a $500 ceiling), but only thirty dollars an hour in
court. In Mississippi the hourly rate varies, but it averages just under
twelve dollars an hour (with a $1000 ceiling). Besides paying niggardly
wages, the states that make up the so-called southern "Death Belt" tend
to appoint lawyers who are highly inexperienced.181 More than half of
the lawyers appointed to represent capital defendants in six southern
states (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and Florida)
had not previously handled a capital case. Only five percent had handled
more than ten trials. Lawyers in these states who represent capital de-
fendants are disciplined by their respective state bar administrations at
rates forty-six times higher than other lawyers in these states.
Of course, many lawyers who represent capital defendants are quite
competent. As a result of systemic factors, however, even they will face
enormous obstacles in assembling an adequate defense because of low
compensation rates and the inadequate sums allowed for investigation
and retention of experts. Still, as virtually any lawyer who has handled a
he received (an additional $19,850). It is noteworthy that the trial judge charged with approv-
ing Scardino's request was involved in a close reelection contest in November 1990; his oppo-
nent in that race was Scardino. Scardino has pointed out that the trial itself, including jury
selection, took three months, and there was substantial investigation and pretrial work before
that. See Rad Sallee, 2 Buntion Lawyers Threaten to Sue Over Legal Fees, Costs, HOUSTON
CHRON., Feb. 27, 1991, at 20A.
179. The statistics on fees and lawyer experience outlined in this section have been widely
discussed of late. See Mark Curriden, Indigent Defense in the South: Begging for Justice,
A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 64; Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 20, at 30-31; see also Michael G.
Millman, Financing the Right to Counsel in Capital Cases, 19 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 383 (1985).
In response to Curriden's article in theA.B.A. Journal critical of the inadequate fees paid
by southern states to court-appointed lawyers in capital cases, a West Virginia resident re-
sponded that effective July 1990, the hourly rate for such counsel had been increased in West
Virginia to $65 per hour. Conceding that this figure was still below the market rate, this letter
writer characterized this new fee scale as a "great improvement." Letter from Michele W.
Good, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1991, at 10.
180. The statistics cited in this paragraph are, unless otherwise noted, drawn from Cur-
riden, supra note 179.
181. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 20, at 32.
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habeas petition for a capital inmate on a pro bono basis will attest, the
presence of a number of talented lawyers should not obscure the fact that
many of the lawyers who represent capital defendants are among the
worst lawyers in the United States.
A resident of death row in Texas, for example, was represented by a
lawyer who repeatedly fell asleep during jury selection and then again at
trial."l 2 Often the examples of a lawyer's misconduct are difficult to ver-
ify, because the lawyer and the inmate are involved in a swearing
match.183 At times, however, and in this particular instance, there are
means to ascertain the truth. This particular death row inmate's story
has been confirmed by the somnambulist lawyer's co-counsel who,
though out of law school less than a year, had been appointed to sit as
second chair in this capital trial. Although the state trial court held that
this conduct did not satisfy the Strickland standard for ineffectiveness, it
is difficult to imagine that either of these lawyers-the tyro or the
sleeper-could have had the prescience that current new rule jurispru-
dence demands. 184
Equally unseemly is the behavior of many of the judges. For exam-
ple, a Texas man was recently executed after electing to forego his ap-
peals.18 5 The date he was executed is easy to remember because it fell on
a state holiday, San Jacinto Day. That was no coincidence: A certain
Texas judge delights in setting execution dates on holidays. He ordered
that the so-called Candyman, Ronald Clark O'Bryan, who was convicted
of murdering his son by lacing his Halloween candy with cyanide (to
182. Ex parte Johnson, No. 286 440-B (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 1979).
183. Lawyers who handle prisoners' habeas petitions know of the inmates' tendency to
prevaricate. Virtually all of them, for example, maintain their innocence. One is therefore
loathe to credit the story of a condemned man. Of course, the lawyers charged with incompe-
tence also have a significant incentive to lie-it is their competence that is being called into
question. Hence, it is not necessarily a simple matter to dismiss the inmates' allegations.
184. Professor Arkin's fine article on Teague does not address trial counsel incompetence
directly, but a recognition of it lies beneath the surface of his discussion, in which he concludes
that current retroactivity doctrine creates a "prisoner's dilemma" in which a habeas petitioner
can avoid procedural default only by establishing that he is relying on a novel rule of law, after
which the rule's novelty is used to deny relief under Teague. Mark M. Arkin, The Prisoner's
Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REv. 371, 419
(1991).
185. The inmate was Michael Derrick. Some defendants who are convicted choose to give
up. That is their right, and those who purport to represent death row inmates ought to respect
it. The reason for this is that the Eighth Adhendment is, in my view (and my parlance), an
individual right, not a societal right. See David R. Dow, Standing and Rights, 36 EMORY L.J.
1195, 1197 (1987) (defining societal rights as those which, when abridged, cause no distinctive
injury but instead an injury that is necessarily widespread and similar).
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collect on a life insurance policy), be executed on Halloween. 18 6 In-
flicting death, irrespective of the debate over whether the state should
even do it at all, is a solemn act. The families of the victims know this,
and so do the guards and wardens; too often the judges and state prose-
cutors187 do not.
Unbeconiing conduct on the part of judges is not terribly uncom-
mon in Texas. At a recent hearing in Harris County, for example, a
different judge was setting an execution date for a man whose conviction
had been affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.1 8 1 In be-
tween the affirmance and the setting of the execution date, the inmate's
lawyer quit without telling anybody, but his desertion was discovered by
a lawyer at the Texas Resource Center, an organization that seeks to
locate pro bono counsel to represent death row inmates.1 89 A lawyer
from the Resource Center appeared in court for the proceeding during
which the execution date was to be set, though the sole purpose of the
Resource Center's appearance was to inform the Court that the inmate
was without counsel and that efforts were underway to locate an attorney
to handle the habeas appeals on a pro bono basis. 190 When the Resource
Center lawyer asked that the setting of an execution date be postponed
until a lawyer could be found, the judge actually laughed out loud.
186. O'Bryan Executed in Texas, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Apr. 6, 1984, at
249 G2, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Facts File.
187. Reputable rumor has it, for example, that prosecutors in Harris County celebrate ex-
ecutions on the nights they take place by drinking champagne in their offices.
188. In Texas, if a defendant is sentenced to death, he gets an automatic appeal to the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the highest criminal court in Texas. No execution date is
set until after the Court of Criminal Appeals affirms the conviction. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071(h) (West Supp. 1991).
189. The Texas Resource Center (TRC), based in Austin, recruits volunteer lawyers to
represent death row inmates in their post-conviction legal struggle. With over 300 inmates on
death row in Texas, this is a difficult job, particularly given the time commitment that effective
post-conviction relief entails. The lawyers with the ideological disposition to do the work tend
to be solo practitioners or practitioners in the less-than-optimal fee categories. The younger
lawyers at the big law firms that have a moral interest in doing the work lack the leverage at
their firms to take on a capital case without firm approval. Finding lawyers is critical, how-
ever, as there are more than 20 death row inmates at any given moment in Texas alone who are
without legal representation. In addition, many of those who do have lawyers have lawyers
who had never handled a criminal case prior to taking on the inmate's case. Thus, the primary
function of the TRC is to help all the lawyers who are trying their best but who really do not
know what they are doing. Similar resource centers exist in Florida and California, the two
states besides Texas with substantial death row populations, and in many other states with
smaller death rows (e.g., Georgia, Alabama, Oklahoma).
190. The episode recounted in this and the following paragraphs, as well as several addi-
tional episodes I report below, are, in my judgment, factually accurate. Every story told in this
essay was confirmed by at least two eyewitnesses. For obvious reasons, it would be imprudent
for me to reveal in most instances the source's identity.
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While denying this request was by no means outrageous (after all, the
setting of an execution date would impel the Resource Center to locate
habeas counsel more expeditiously), the lawyer's request hardly seems
funny. 
191
After a brief discussion, the judge chose a date for the execution. At
that point, the Resource Center lawyer requested that the proceedings be
placed on the record. The judge then stated, into the record, "we have
all agreed" to set the execution date on such-and-such a date. The Re-
source Center lawyer interrupted and said, "Excuse me, but we haven't
all agreed. I have not agreed, and this man is without counsel, so the
petitioner has not agreed." The judge instructed the Resource Center
lawyer to be quiet, telling him that he would get his turn. When his turn
came, the Resource Center lawyer finally raised an on-the-record objec-
tion to the proceeding and the scheduling of an execution date in only
forty-five days when the inmate did not even have counsel. The district
attorney interrupted and chided the lawyer for complaining. The district
attorney said that everyone in the court knew fully well that the inmate
would get a stay, if not from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals then
from a federal court. For the district attorney and the trial judge, the
entire procedure was the first move in a game that would end at the
Supreme Court about forty-four days and twenty-three hours from the
moment they all stood there. The Resource Center lawyer and the in-
mate could not be too sanguine, however, for shortly before this proceed-
191. After the judge laughed, the Resource Center lawyer retreated and asked for 120 days.
Again the judge chuckled and said that there was no way he was going to give the man 120
days. Then he said to the lawyer, "and you know that." The judge added that 30 days ought
to do it, but 30 days would not work because there was another inmate scheduled to die that
day. So the judge asked the district attorney to take out his calendar and asked him how is
such-and-such a date, 40 days from the present date, as if they were discussing a dinner date.
This points to a major problem. Many of the criminal court judges are former assistant
district attorneys. Not only do they socialize with the district attorneys who regularly appear
before them, but they have relationships of trust with them. Judges not only routinely do what
the district attorneys ask, but they actually ask the district attorneys what they should do.
That trial judges are former district attorneys cannot be helped, and maybe it is not even bad,
but we should be aware of this feature of the system when we establish procedural rules.
Fraternities in Texas used to hold parties on the evenings of executions. Those celebrants
were just sophomoric collegians, not criminal court judges. Moreover, the prison officials in-
volved in the executions were as unforgiving as anyone of this flippancy. Reasonable people
disagree on the moral issue posed by executions. Wherever one stands, however, there can be
no question that the taking of a human life is a solemn affair. Those who carry out the execu-
tions realize this (as was evidenced by the attitude and demeanor of the warden of the Missis-
sippi prison system, who was interviewed at length in the BBC documentary entitled Fourteen
Days in May, concerning the execution of Edward Earl Johnson); those who impose the sen-
tence and oversee the process ought to as well.
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ing, an inmate whom everyone thought would get a stay was executed.' 92
That is what Teague, Butler, and Saffle have done.
Among many of the judges involved in the death penalty process
there is an air of nonchalance that is at once understandable and inexcus-
able. The horror of the crimes often makes the focus on procedure seem
a grotesque indulgence. 193 In addition, for all but the Justices of the
Supreme Court, judges can always entertain the idea that there is some
other judge further up the line who can prevent any miscarriage of jus-
tice, some other judge who is double checking. This attitude is unjusti-
fied' 94 and ironic, for the further a case proceeds, the more likely that the
appellate judge will conclude that plenty of other judges have already
scrutinized the issue.195 Even in the federal system, where the judges are
more isolated from political pressures 196 and tend to be more resolute if
not actually better jurists, their frustration and impatience manifests it-
self as disregard for a petitioner's constitutional rights.'9 7 A federal
court of appeals judge, for example, once wrote an opinion denying
habeas relief on the day before the scheduled execution. The judge
wrote: "After a careful review of the record, we conclude . . . ." The
other members of the panel, assuming that this judge had in fact re-
viewed the record and trusting his judgment, signed the opinion denying
relief. In fact, the author of the opinion had not reviewed any part of the
192. McCoy v. State, 713 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en bane), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 940 (1987).
193. Interestingly, Justice Harlan, whose ostensible test is now used to determine the issue
of retroactivity, held the view that the Fourteenth Amendment is entirely about procedure.
See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 540-41 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This view is not
unlike Professor Ely's view of the fundamental concern of the Fourteenth Amendment. JOHN
H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). On the
substance-procedure issue generally, see Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive
Rights, in DUE PROCESS, NOMOS XVIII, at 182 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman
eds., 1977); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 83-90 (1971).
194. This optimism is unjustified because trial judges are elected, are often former prosecu-
tors, and are not inclined to give the indigent, nonvoting defendant much in the way of breaks.
In the 1990 elections in Texas, where appellate judges are also elected, a number of appellate
judges were opposed as being too sensitive to the constitutional rights of accused criminals.
195. See, e.g., Judge Jones' opinion denying relief in Bell v. Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978, 984
(5th Cir. 1988) (Jones, J., concurring) (suggesting that because of the lengthy procedural his-
tory (Bell had been twice tried and sentenced to death) the slight mental retardation could not
have been perceived as mitigating).
196. Cf. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977).
197. Of course, by the time the case gets to this stage, the petitioner has only half a quiver
of constitutional arrows left to fire. See Arkin, supra note 184, at 407-08 (comparing the di-
lemma presented by the Wainwright v. Sykes procedural default rule and the Teague retroac-
tivity rule to a "whipsaw").
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record, for it had never entered that judge's chambers. 19 We can only
guess how often this occurs, but that it does occur is scandalous.' 9 9
When we talk about the system being corrupt, therefore, we are
talking not only about the lawyers, or elected state-court hanging judges,
or members of the federal bench. We are talking about the entire system,
top to bottom.
The single most significant step that can be implemented to cleanse
the system is to ensure competent lawyers at the trial level. Of course,
judges must remain vigilant and must keep in mind that the judges who
reviewed the record before them may not have done so thoroughly. Nev-
ertheless, the ultimate problem remains the lawyers. Stories of ineptitude
abound, and they would be hysterically funny were someone not on
death row because of them. One lawyer failed to object when the prose-
cutor said, during closing argument, "The woman's vagina was cut off
and it was never found; the defendant probably ate it."2" Another law-
yer failed to object when the prosecutor implored the jury to give the
defendant the death penalty. "Don't just send him to prison for life," the
prosecutor begged. "The defendant is homosexual, and we all know
what goes on inside of prisons, so sending him there would be like send-
ing him to a party." 0' 1 These vignettes are but trivial additions to the
legion of incredible episodes that take place daily in capital prosecutions.
They are known to many, but not to enough. In her recent review of
various proposals for habeas reform, Professor Berger captures the flavor
in a single trenchant sentence:
Hence, among the knowledgeable, horror stories abound of defense
counsel who refer to the accused as a "nigger" in front of the jury,
who indicate that they are representing the client with reluctance,
who absent themselves from court while a prosecution witness
takes the stand, who adduce no evidence in favor of the client at
the penalty phase, or who file no brief on appeal.20 2
Most of the defendants in capital murder cases did in fact "do it." But
this is constitutionally of no moment. Regardless of whether it is cate-
gorically "cruel" to execute criminals, it is manifestly "unusual" when
the only defendants realistically subjected to this sanction are those with
inept trial attorneys. The Eighth Amendment problem is that the ques-
198. For reasons that I trust are obvious, I cannot name either the judge or the sources of
this information.
199. See also Bird v. Collins, 934 F.2d 629, 630 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2820
(1991).
200. Cook v. State, 741 S.W.2d 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), vacated, 488 U.S. 807 (1988).
201. Burdine v. State, 719 S.W.2d 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en bane), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 940 (1987).
202. Berger, supra note 33, at 1670 (citations omitted).
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tion of who gets sentenced to death has less to do with whether the de-
fendant did it than with the quality of the defendant's lawyer.
C. How Bad It Is-The Numbers
It is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the number of death
sentences that have been handed down due to inadequate representa-
tion.2" 3 Nevertheless, the data I have collected suggest a significant cor-
relation between the quality of trial counsel and the imposition of the
death penalty (instead of a lesser sentence, such as life imprisonment).
In collecting this data I began with the hypothesis that the quality of
trial counsel in jurisdictions that have public defender offices would be
superior to the quality of indigent trial counsel elsewhere. The bases for
this hypothesis were as follows:
(1) Public defenders are ideologically committed to their jobs, and
thus generally work more aggressively than their state-appointed
counterparts.
2°4
(2) Public defender jobs are difficult to get. Because the positions
are so competitive, those who hire can insist on individuals of the highest
caliber. Few of these individuals plan to make a career out of this work,
and the bum-out rate is substantial. Nevertheless, the level of produc-
tion during their tenures is high.
(3) Public defenders have access to state resources for pretrial inves-
tigations. This bestows an enormous advantage over court-appointed
lawyers, even those with stellar qualifications, whose inadequate remu-
203. This is so because of the sheer number of variables involved. Different attitudes to-
ward the death penalty may be associated with geography; crimes vary in their luridness; indi-
vidual characteristics of both the killer and the victim may affect the jury; relative skills of the
defense attorneys and the prosecutors may have an impact on the juro's decision. The data I
have collected controls for none of these variables. Although several scholars have attempted
to control many of these variables to determine which play the largest role in determining
whether the defendant will be sentenced to death, see, eg., DAVID C. BALDUS, EQUAL JUS-
TICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 140-88 (1990) (presenting statistical data suggesting that
race of victim plays a role in death sentencing); M. Dwayne Smith, Patterns of Discrimination
in Assessments of the Death Penalty: The Case of Louisiana, 15 J. CRIM. JUST. 279 (1987),
these studies are compelled to assign numerical values to the perceived seriousness of the of-
fense. This obviously calls for a judgment on the part of the statisticians, but there is no way to
know whether this evaluation coincides with that of the jury that actually sentenced the de-
fendant.
Thus, there are many pitfalls to which we must be alert. In spite of these various difficul-
ties, I do think we can hazard tentative conclusions on the basis of the data.
204. See, e.g., the profile of Steve Bright in A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 8. Although not a
public defender, Bright has spent his legal career representing capital defendants and death
row inmates. He runs the Southern Center for Human Rights on an annual budget of less than
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neration makes such investigation prohibitive.2"5
(4) In jurisdictions with public defenders, even those defendants
who rely on private counsel will benefit insofar as the public defenders
office can act as a resource for private lawyers.
The difference in quality of counsel might affect various stages of the
process. For instance, prosecutors might be more reluctant to charge
defendants with capital murder when the prosecutors believe they will
face a tough, drawn-out trial. Therefore, there may be fewer capital mur-
der indictments in jurisdictions with public defenders." 6 This possibil-
ity, of course, is difficult to measure, though it does not appear to be
reflected by the data. In addition, an assortment of variables could qual-
ify our firm conclusions from the data. For example, it is difficult to
compare the seriousness of various offenses within a single jurisdiction,
and even more difficult to compare seriousness across jurisdictions.20 7
Cognizant of these hazards, my focus has been on four criteria:
(1) The number of capital murder indictments.
(2) The number of cases that proceed to trial under a capital mur-
der indictment (the first criteria, minus the number of plea bargains, re-
ductions in charges, and dismissals).
(3) The number of guilty verdicts for capital murder (the second
criteria, minus the number of acquittals, plea agreements reached during
trial, and convictions for lesser offenses).
(4) The number of death sentences (the third criteria, minus the
number of lesser sentences).
The data fairly and powerfully suggest that, measured either in terms of
ability to avoid a guilty verdict or in terms of ability to secure a sentence
lesser than death, public defenders are significantly more successful than
their private counterparts.20
205. In addition, public defenders, as specialists, may have a knowledge of the total uni-
verse of capital cases that attorneys who only periodically represent capital defendants lack.
This difference would aid the public defender in negotiating pleas and hazarding educated
guesses on the question of what a jury would be likely to do.
206. In fact, the data suggest that this is not necessarily the case.
207. An example of an effort to control for this variable can be found in the work of
BALDUS, supra note 203 (studying imposition of the death penalty in Georgia).
208. I do not address the success of public defenders at the appellate level. However, it
appears from the data that their success at the appellate level approximates their success at the
trial level. For example, the appellate public defender's office in New Jersey has won 26 out of
its 27 appeals in the New Jersey Supreme Court. See Joseph F. Sullivan, New Jersey Defenders
Battle Death Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1991, at A13.
In addition to the issues alluded to supra note 203, another limitation on the utility of the
data is that not all jurisdictions were able to supply information on identical statistical catago-
ries. My focus, however, has been limited to states with significant death row populations.





Number of indictments 71
Number guilty of capital murder 36
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences 11**
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences 32%
(where sentence is known)
* Information compiled from news clippings, and therefore incomplete.




Number of indictments 3
Number guilty of capital murder 2
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences 0
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences 0%
(where sentence is known)
* Information compiled from news clippings, and therefore incomplete.
attitudinal differences presumably associated with geographical region do not play an espe-
cially skewing role here.
I compiled these data with the generous assistance of the following people:
Alabama: Eva Ansley and Will Fitzpatrick, Alabama Capital Representation Resource
Center.
California: Steve Carroll, Public Defender's Office of San Diego; Judy Farncomb, Central
Public Defender's Office.
Florida: Ted Parker, Office of Computer Services and Information Systems, Dade
County; Gordon Morgan and Darryl Hanzelon, Office of the Circuit and County Courts, Fel-
ony Division, Jacksonville; Edith Georgi, Public Defender's Office of Miami.
Georgia: Eric Kocher, Southern Prisoners' Defense Committee; Patsy Morris, Georgia
Resource Center.
Kentucky: Lisa Davis, Kentucky Capital Litigation Resource Center.
Mississippi: Sheila O'Flaherty and Jim Craig, Capital Defense Resource Center.
Nevada: Bruce Anderson, District Attorney's Office, Clark County.
North Carolina: Patrick Tamer, Administrative Office of the Courts; Kin Hinnis, Appel-
late Defender's Office.
South Carolina: John Blume, South Carolina Resource Center.
Texas: Norman Kinne, District Attorney's Office, Dallas; Bert Graham, District Attor-
ney's Office, Harris County; Tim Palmquist, Bexar County Clerk's Office, San Antonio.
Virginia: Bart Stapert and Marie Deans, Virginia Coalition on Jails and Prisons.
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Number guilty of capital murder
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences
(where sentence is known)
* Information compiled from news clippings, and therefore incomplete.
** There is no information on the sentence of the other; the death penalty
was assessed despite the jury's recommendation of life without parole.
50%
in the known case
Alabama*-Type of Representation Unknown
Number of indictments
Number guilty of capital murder
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences
(where sentence is known)
* Information compiled from news clippings, and therefore incomplete.








Number of cases filed with special circumstances (i.e.,
number of capital murder indictments)
Number that proceed to guilt/innocence determination
Number that proceed to penalty phase
Number that receive life without possibility for parole
Number that receive death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences










* Approximately 90% of indigent capital defendants in California are represented by public
defenders.
** In some years, 1989 for example, a significant number of cases are disposed of after a guilty
verdict. These cases result in life without parole. This reflects another stage at which public
defenders are successful in avoiding the death penalty.
NOTE: These numbers operate as estimates in the following regard: Although the number of
indictments is kept on an annual basis, the cases are not tracked individually, and some of
them will be disposed of in subsequent calendar years. Hence, the dispositions in 1989 will
include some cases that were filed in 1988, and so on. This does not appear to affect the data,




1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Cases where death penalty was sought 47
Indigent 37
Retained 10
Number of death sentences 11 15 16 10 9 16
Jacksonville, Florida---Court Appointed Counsel
1988 1989 1990
Number of capital murder indictments 7 19 8
Number pleading guilty 1 2 3
Number of not guilty verdicts 0 0 0
Number of guilty verdicts 0 0 1
Number of death sentences 0 0 0
Number of life or lesser sentences 1 2 3
Nolle prosequi 1 0 4
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death 0% 0% 0%
sentences
Jacksonville, Florida-Private Appointed Counsel
1988 1989 1990
Number of capital murder indictments 7 19 8
Number pleading guilty 1 0 0
Number of not guilty verdicts 0 0 1
Number of guilty verdicts 1 2 0
Number of death sentences 0 0 0
Number of life or lesser sentences 2 1 0
Nolle prosequi 0 2 0




Number of capital murder indictments 7 19 8
Number pleading guilty 4 12 2
Number of not guilty verdicts 0 2 0
Number of guilty verdicts 0 1 1
Number of death sentences 0 1 0
Number of life or lesser sentences 4 12 2
Nolle prosequi .0 1 2
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death 0% 0% 0%
sentences
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Dade County, Florida (Miami)-Private Attorneys*
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Number of capital murder 10
indictments
Number that proceed to trial
Number of guilty verdicts
Number of death sentences
Number of life sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts
resulting in death
sentences
* Retained primarily by drug offenders.


























Dade County, Florida (Miami)-Public Defenders
1985
Number of capital murder indict- 101
ments
Number that proceed to trial 9
Number of guilty verdicts 6
Number of death sentences 0
Number of life sentences 5
Percentage of guilty verdicts 0%
resulting in death sentences
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990


























Dade County, Florida (Miami)-Special Assigned Attorneys*
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
Number of capital murder indict- 101 91 77 115
ments
Number that proceed to trial 20 26 14 34
Number of guilty verdicts 13 24 13 25
Number of death sentences 1 6 2 2
Number of life sentences 12 16 10 20
Percentage of guilty verdicts 8% 25% 16% 8%
resulting in death sentences
* Used in cases of conflict with public defenders.














1985 1986 1987 1988 1989** 1990**
Number of capital murder indict-
ments
Number of capital murder cases
that proceed to trial
Number of pleas
Number of guilty verdicts
Number of death sentences
Number of life sentences
Number of life sentences without
parole before 25 years
Percentage of guilty verdicts
resulting in death sentences
58 40 34 27 17 8






7% 20% 22% 0 ? ?
* Public defenders represent 100% of indigent capital defendants.
** Data from 1989 and 1990 are incomplete due to continuances and pending appeals.
Kentucky-Retained Counsel
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989* 1990*
Number of capital murder indict-
ments
Number of capital murder cases that
proceed to trial
8 13 11 1 3 3
5 6 11 2 0 1
Number of pleas 7 7 2 2 0 0
Number of guilty verdicts 1 6 5 1 0 3
Number of death sentences 1 1 0 0 0 1
Number of life sentences 1 6 2 0 1 0
Number of life sentences without 1 0 0 0 0 0
parole before 25 years
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting 100% 17% 0? ?
in death sentences
* Data from 1989 and 1990 are incomplete due to continuances and pending appeals.
Mississippi*--(Estimates)
30-50 cases per year where State initially seeks death penalty
25% proceed to trial
80% represented by court-appointed lawyers
(three counties have a full time public defender)
55-90% result in death sentences
* In 1991, twelve cases actually proceeded to trial under a capital murder indictment. Three
defendants pleaded during trial. Of the nine jury verdicts, seven found the defendant guilty of
capital murder (and two found the defendant guilty of simple murder). Of the seven capital
murder verdicts, the jury sentenced five of the defendants to death and two to life.
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Number of defendants charged with murder or murder with a 204
deadly weapon
Number dismissed prior to trial or at trial 52
Number found guilty of capital murder 42
Number found guilty of lesser charge 2
Number found not guilty 10
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences 10
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in life without possible 9
parole
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in life with possible parole 10
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in death sentences** 25%
* Figures quoted as being 90% accurate. Approximately 60% of indigent capital defendants
are represented by public defenders.
** In addition, 2 of the 98 defendants who pleaded guilty received a sentence of death.
North Carolina-Private Appointed Counsel
1986
Number of capital murder indict- 465
ments
Total number disposed 221
Number of dismissals 18
Guilty pleas to charged offense/to 55/80
lesser offense
Number of cases that went to trial 64
Number of convictions 48
(percentage)* (75%)
Number of acquittals 13
(percentage)* (20%)
Number of death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts
resulting in death sentences
1987 1988 1989 1990



























* Percentages do not equal 100; remainder pleaded during trial.
North Carolina-Private Retained Counsel
1986
Number of capital murder indict- 465
ments
Total number disposed 166
Number of dismissals 18
Guilty pleas to charged offense/to 48/31
lesser offense
Number of cases that went to trial 57
Number of convictions 40
(percentage)* (70%)
Number of acquittals 16
(percentage)* (28%)
Number of death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts
resulting in death sentences
1987 1988 1989 1990







































*Percentages do not equal 100, remainder pleaded during trial.
** One additional death sentence was imposed on a defendant who represented himself.
North Carolina-Public Defenders




Guilty pleas to charged offense/to
lesser offense





Number of death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts result-
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South Carolina*--(Estimates)
Number of capital murder indictments
Number that proceed to trial
Number of guilty verdicts
Number of death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting
Composite of 1985-1990
25-30 cases per year where state files
notice of intent to seek death penalty
10 go to trial/20 plead out
9 found guilty




* Public defenders represent 80% of indigent capital defendants.
Dallas, Texas-Private Appointed Counsel*
1985 1986 198
Number of capital murder indict- n/a n/a nA/
ments
Number of cases that went to trial 0 1 7
Number of convictions 0 1 7
Number of death penalty sentences 0 1 7
Percentage of guilty verdicts result- - 100% 100
ing in death sentences







Harris County, Texas (Houston)-Private Appointed Counsel*












Number of capital murder indict- 32 41 27 27 26 n/a
ments
Number of capital murder trials 9 18 7 12 13 n/a
Number of guilty verdicts 9 18 7 12 13 n/a
Number of death penalty sentences 7 13 7 9 9 n/a
Number of life sentences 2 5 0 3 4 n/a
Percentage of guilty verdicts result- 77% 72% 100% 75% 70% n/a
ing in death sentences
* All of the defendants were represented by court-appointed attorneys except for one case in
1988, resulting in a life sentence.
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San Antonio, Texas-Private Court Appointed Counsel
Number of capital murder indict-
ments
Number of cases that went to trial
Number of guilty pleas to capital
murder
Number of guilty verdicts (excluding
pleas)
Number of guilty verdicts resulting
in death sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts result-
ing in death sentences
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990
10 8 8 10 11 9
4 3 4 3 7 1
1 4 4 5 1 0
4 3 4 3 7 1
2 1 2 1 6 1




Number of capital murder indictments 75 [vs. 29 for June 1986-July 1987]
Number convicted of capital murder 20 [24*]
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in 4 [4*]
death sentences
Number of guilty verdicts resulting in 16
life sentences
Percentage of guilty verdicts resulting in 20%
death sentences
* Number in brackets include trials for Timothy Spencer, who was convicted and sentenced to
death four separate times.
NOTE: The Virginia Coalition on Trial and Prisons established a Pre-Trial Tracking and
Assistance Project to aid in the representation of capital defendants. Of the 75 indictments
during this period, the Project assisted in 68 cases. Of those resulting in death, the Project
assisted in only one (excluding Timothy Spencer).
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The data suggest that in jurisdictions which use public defenders,
the prosecutors' rate of success in obtaining the death penalty for those
charged with capital murder ranges from zero (Kentucky and Florida) to
around fifty percent (Alabama). On the other hand, the prosecutors' rate
of success in jurisdictions that rely entirely on private court-appointed
lawyers to represent indigent capital defendants ranges from around fifty
percent (South Carolina) to one hundred percent (Texas).
It is possible that there are explanations for these distributions that
have nothing to do with the quality of counsel. For example, it may be
the case that more of the defendants in Harris County "did it" as com-
pared to defendants in Kentucky. Absent some indication of qualitative
differences in police work, however, that hypothesis lacks plausibility.
The more reasonable explanation suggested by the above numbers is the
competence of trial counsel and the resources available to them.
11. Reforms-Who Should Do It and What They Should Do
Federal reform of the death penalty system involves two distinct
components. Death penalty laws themselves are often infirm, °9 and re-
pairing them is up to the states. The federal role here, the responsibility
of the judiciary, is to specify what characteristics these statutes must pos-
sess in order to pass constitutional muster, and then to determine
whether given statutes do in fact possess these characteristics. Federal
involvement occurs through the writ of habeas corpus used to challenge
death sentences. As a body of federal law, the habeas corpus rules are
obviously drafted and amended by the federal government. Thus, if part
of the problem with current death penalty litigation stems from the rules
of habeas corpus, federal action may well be called for.
Even if it is true that the rules of habeas corpus are partly responsi-
ble for the gridlock in the death penalty system-a supposition that un-
derlies current reform efforts-we must be wary of two traps: the
tendency to blame the rules of federal habeas corpus for problems that in
fact inhere in a state's own death penalty statute, and the possibility that
a state might repair a discrete feature of its death penalty statute without
simultaneously improving the level of representation ordinarily provided
to indigent capital defendants. Congress ought not to permit states to
take advantage of amendments to the rules of habeas corpus that are
designed to shorten the time between imposition of sentence and execu-
tion unless Congress is first persuaded that the states have provided a
level of counsel appropriate to the capital context. Irrespective of the
209. See, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
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Supreme Court's interpretation of the threshold demanded by the Sixth
Amendment, Congress can surely insist that the pace of executions be
accelerated only in those jurisdictions that have redressed the denial of
comparative justice that stems from inadequate trial counsel.
A. The Price of Having Values
Locating state legislators who are urging reform of their own states'
death penalty laws is a difficult ssignment. State officials appear to rely
on federal solutions. Unless the rules of habeas corpus are blameworthy,
however, the delay cannot fairly be attributed to the federal government.
In addition, even the proposed repairs to the habeas system focus to a
significant degree on the question of guilt versus innocence.210
Nothing gives greater pause, to either proponents or critics of the
death penalty, than the terrible prospect of executing an innocent person.
So the focus on saving innocent persons is predictable. The most popular
"ideal" system of collateral review is one that would save the innocent
from the gallows without also freeing the guilty on the basis of so-called
technicalities. Proposals that seek to attain this ideal have a great intui-
tive appeal, for they seem to satisfy the philosophical notion of desert
and, at the same time, the sentiment expressed'by Judge Cardozo that it
is unthinkable that the criminal go free merely because the constable has
blundered.21 1 These proposals permit us to indulge our consciences and
rest assured that we are not executing the innocent, and also to sidestep
the clamoring masses who huddle in fear from crime and seem ready to
trade the Constitution for more potent law enforcement.21 2 Current sug-
gestions for habeas reform offer the impossible. They pretend that it is
210. In this regard, these proposals are misguided in a way that'is analogous to the Court's
analysis in Teague and its progeny. For example, as Jeffries and Stuntz put it, "Our focus is on
factual innocence. By that phrase, we mean to include anyone who did not commit the crime
with which he or she is charged." Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 691. They quite clearly
seem to focus on whether the petitioner actually "did it." In this regard, they are following the
late Judge Friendly's suggestion that habeas relief be available only to those petitioners who
"can make a colorable showing of factual innocence." IM at 692; see Henry J. Friendly, Is
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 142
(1970). Like Judge Friendly, Jeifries and Stuntz approximate the spin given to the Harlan test
by the Teague plurality. My reference in the text also includes the recent proposals in Con-
gress. These are discussed and evaluated in Berger, supra note 33, at 1704-13. The ABA
proposals do not seem to me to suffer from this obsessive focus. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra
note 32. For a philosophical attack on the actual innocence focus, see Irene M. Rosenberg &
Yale L. Rosenberg, Guilt Judge Friendly Meets the MaHaRaL of Prague, - MICH. L. Rv.
- (forthcoming 1992).
211. People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926).
212. See Rosenberg, supra note 151, at 376 (observing that the Teague line of cases "effec-
tively capsulizes the popular sentiment that the accused in a criminal case is entitled to free-
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costless to have values; they intimate that we can be utilitarians and at
the same time adhere to the Constitution in every instance.
This is simply not so. It is always harder to have values and adhere
to them than not to have values, or to overlook them when the pressures
to do so are great. More importantly, suggestions that focus narrowly on
protecting the "arguably innocent 2 13 embody the same epistemological
error committed by the Teague plurality and now prominent in retroac-
tivity analysis. This emphasis confounds the notion of guilt, a purely
legal notion, with the question of whether the defendant actually did
it.214 Whether a particular defendant is found guilty by a jury obviously
has a great deal to do with whether that defendant did it; these issues are
emphatically not unrelated. But it also has a great deal to do with
whether a defendant who concededly did it has a good lawyer or a not-
so-good one.215 As we have seen, their lawyers are often not so good,
especially when the defendants are indigent and on trial in a jurisdiction
that lacks a public defender system. This is, in part, why someone like
Cullen Davis, who, on at least one presentation of the facts, seems to
have "done it," can be found not guilty,216 while others like Clarence
Brandley and Randall Dale Adams, who have since been deemed inno-
cent, were determined by the jury to have done it and came within days
213. See Boshkoff, supra note 2; Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 15, at 691; Friendly, supra
note 210, at 142.
214. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
215. Muneer Mohammed Deeb was sentenced to death after being found guilty of hiring
David Wayne Spence to kill Gayle Kelley, who had spurned Deeb's romantic overtures.
(Spence had kidnapped, assaulted, and killed three people, but not Kelley, in what was suppos-
edly a case of mistaken identity.) Deeb's conviction was overturned in July 1991, some seven
and one-half months after Deeb was sent to death row, and Deeb has decided that if he is
retried he will not again rely on a court-appointed lawyer. "This time I'm going to get the best
lawyers money can buy," he is quoted as saying. Kathy Fair, Conviction Overturned, Inmate
Now Seeks a Job, HOUSTON CHRON., July 6, 1991, at 26A.
At this point, one might observe that if my argument is that the difference between life
and death is the difference between a more and less competent lawyer, then a possible solution
would be to increase executions rather than decrease them, i.e., attempt to insure that more of
the defendants who did it, but happen to have good lawyers, also get sentenced to death. I
confess that in theory this solution would redress the primary philosophical objection I empha-
size. Cf. KANT, supra note 143. As a practical matter, however, it is utterly unrealistic. The
data in Part II.C strongly suggest that competent lawyers at the trial stage consistently defeat
the prosecutors' pleas for death. The reasons for this are beyond the scope of this Article.
However, I would surmise that the phenomenon results at least in part from the decisions that
prosecutors make concerning the allocation of scarce resources. Whatever the explanation, the
preliminary data seem striking.
216. Davis was defended by the famous Richard "Racehorse" Haynes, and the trials are




The exclusive focus on innocence versus guilt also overlooks the fact
that the sentencing phase of a capital trial is at least as critical as the
guilt-innocence stage. Once the jury considers punishment, the defend-
ant's putative guilt has already been established and the question is sim-
ply the appropriate level of punishment. Thus, even if guilt versus
innocence were the appropriate focus at the first stage of the trial, it
would still be a red herring at the punishment stage. Further, testimony
and evidence presented at the guilt-innocence stage do not suddenly
cease to influence jurors when they are considering punishment. This
means that even mistakes made at the outset of the trial, or well before
the trial begins, might well have an impact at the culmination of the trial.
B. The Death Penalty and the States
Americans favor the death penalty.218  Thirty-five states have a
death penalty statute, and thirty-three states have at least one resident on
death row.2 19 Only one state that permits capital punishment statutorily
excludes the mentally retarded from those subject to this highest pen-
alty.220 Executing criminals as young as sixteen years old is legal in our
217. Exparte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886, 891-94 (rex. Crim. App. 1989) (en bane) (revers-
ing Brandley's conviction on grounds that the state conducted a flawed investigation and, in
violation of defendant's due process rights, suppressed evidence favorable to the accused).
218. See Hans Zeisel & Alec M. Gallup, 5 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 285 (1989)
(analyzing Gallup Poll data from 1936 to 1986); Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1990,
at Al (71% of those surveyed favored death penalty for murder); see also Neil Vidmar &
Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Research on Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment, in DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA 68, 84 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (hypothesizing, after a review of various
attitudinal studies, that some people may favor the idea of the death penalty without realizing
or accepting its implications); DAVID LESTER, THE DEATH PENALTY-ISsuES AND AN-
sWERS 17-25 (1987) (noting that death penalty attitudinal studies consistently reveal that capi-
tal punishment is more strongly supported by older people, the less educated, those earning
more, whites, those with authoritarian attitudes, and conservatives).
However, for a collection of popular opposition to capital punishment, see IAN GRAY &
MOIRA STANLEY, A PUNISHMENT IN SEARCH OF A CRIME: AMERICANS SPEAK OUT
AGAINST THE DEATH PENALTY (1989). See also The Execution of Ronnie Dinkins (Cont'd),
WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1989, at B6 (letter from Dorothea B. Morefield to Editor, Washington
Post) (mother whose son was killed by death row inmate argues that death penalty is not the
answer).
219. NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUC. FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A., Aug. 23,
1991, at 1. One defendant has been sentenced to death under the federal death penalty statute.
See A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991, at 24.
220. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (Harrison Supp. 1990); see Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding insufficient evidence of national consensus against exe-
cuting the mentally retarded and thus concluding that the Eighth Amendment does not cate-
gorically prohibit punishment of such individuals).
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society.2 2' In view of this popular feeling, it is unrealistic to expect the
political processes of the states, by definition sensitive to local popular
sentiment, to be especially concerned with safeguarding the integrity of
the capital punishment process.
What activities to criminalize and how severely to punish them are
prototypical examples of issues left to the discretion of the states. It is
precisely within this sphere of sovereignty that thirty-five states have en-
acted capital punishment laws.222 The problems of delay associated with
imposition of the death penalty are related entirely to state death penalty
laws. Consequently, problems in this area would seem quintessentially
suited to resolution by the states. Absent some indication that the states
are impotent or that Congress has interfered with their power to punish,
there is no constitutionally sound basis for Congress or the federal courts
to intrude into this area of state sovereignty.223 If death penalty laws are
being frustrated, the frustration should be felt precisely in the states that
are being precluded from implementing their laws. Principles of federal-
ism mandate that the states be permitted, if not required, to repair their
own systems and insure where possible that their laws not be frustrated
by legitimate constitutional concerns.224 The death penalty problem is,
in short, initially a state problem.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's involvement in the political movement to
reform habeas corpus procedures is thus anomalous. Similarly, the ex-
tensive congressional interest in this area, insofar as it precedes efforts by
the states to bring their own systems into compliance with constitutional
dictates, is difficult to justify. Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed retired
Justice Lewis Powell to chair a commission organized to investigate the
pervasive problem of delay in death penalty appeals and to recommend
measures to streamline appeals and speed up executions. The Powell
Commission's report makes no mention of the responsibility of the states
to repair their own systems and is silent about the quality of counsel
221. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (5-4 decision).
222. Although there is a federal death penalty law, only one person has been sentenced to
die under it.
223. Admittedly, it has become fashionable to say that the laws of the states with death
penalty statutes are being frustrated. Yet such assertions tend to emanate to a great degree
from federal, not state, officials. Their standing to voice such concerns must be regarded as
suspect.
224. See Mark Ballard, ABA Panel Calls for State-Paid Death Row Counsel, TEX. LAw.,
Dec. 4, 1989, at 4 (proposing that Congress enact legislation allowing states that provide paid
attorneys for death row inmates to take advantage of streamlined method of post-conviction
appeals in capital cases). In support of this proposal, the late Fifth Circuit Judge Alvin Rubin
argued that "[i]f the state chooses the death penalty, you have to afford the accused his consti-
tutional rights .... And that costs money." Id. at 5.
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provided during the typical capital trial.22 5 These silences are stunning.
Furthermore, both the House and Senate, which have -recently consid-
ered amendments to the habeas corpus rules and will do so again in the
current Congress, have refused to link acceleration of the habeas appeals
system with the requirement that states provide competent counsel at the
trial stage.226
The lust for executions that certain federal judges display is espe-
cially ironic since these same judges are ordinarily proponents of a theory
of federalism that values independence of the states and protects them
against incursions by the federal government.2 27 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, for example, observed that the essence of the death penalty ques-
tion is "the pros and cons of federalism, ' 22 ' but he has nonetheless been
at the forefront in urging Congress, a federal body, to remedy problems
that are largely remediable at the state level and that are in fact within
the legitimate province of state control. Similarly, Judge Edith Jones'
proposals for reform in the Fifth Circuit,22 9 which in substance are not
dissimilar from those offered below, have the odd cast of a federal judge's
recommending to a state how it ought to repair its own system.
All this federal participation, from Chief Justice Rehnquist to Judge
Jones to Congress, is quite peculiar, because the decision to impose a
death sentence is a state decision, and states that have elected to impose
the death penalty are in a position to accelerate executions without any
intervention by Congress or federal judges. Texas, for example, requires
that an execution date be set thirty days in advance of the scheduled
execution,210 but does not require that the trial judge set the date at any
particular time. If Texas wanted to speed up its own system, it could
provide that execution dates be set, for example, eighteen months in ad-
225. This point is discussed in Berger, supra note 33, at 1674-84.
226. The proposals were amendments to the Omnibus Crime Bill. Because the conference
committee could not resolve the differences between the two houses speedily, the habeas re-
forms were dropped from the crime bill. This is an important issue, however, and it has reap-
peared in the current Congress. I have previously criticized the version of habeas reform that
was contemplated by the Senate in the last Congress. See David IL Dow, Rush to Judgment,
TEx. OBSERVER, June 15, 1990, at 8. For a response to this criticism, see the letter from Orrin
G. Hatch, U.S. Senator, to David R. Dow, reprinted in TEX. OBSERVER, Sept. 28, 1990, at 2.
227. See, e.g., Justice Scalia's opinion in Madden v. Texas, 111 S. Ct. 902 (Scalia, Circuit
Justice 1991) (denying applicants' motions to extend time for filing habeas petitions).
228. William Rehnquist, Remarks at the American Law Institute Annual Meeting (May
15, 1990).
229. Edith H. Jones, Death Penalty Procedures: A Proposal for Reform, 53 TEX. BAR J.
850, 852-53 (1990) (proposing that the Texas Attorney General's Office, the TRC, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals, and the federal district and circuit courts all cooperate to remove
procedural obstacles to enforcement of Texas' death penalty).
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vance. The state could further require that a trial court judge set an
execution date within six weeks of the decision by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals to affirm the conviction. State law could then insist
that an inmate's habeas petition be filed within six months of the sched-
uled execution date. This would provide ample time for judges to ex-
amine thoughtfully the issues raised in the petition, without the time
pressures of eleventh-hour appeals. It is simply a matter of amending
state law. No "assistance" from the federal government is necessary.
Whether judges would in fact scrutinize the petitions even if given
adequate time is a different matter, but the penchant some judges have
for neglecting to read transcripts231 would be somewhat less consequent-
ial if states were to provide, by public defenders or some other system,
highly competent trial counsel for capital defendants. Delay exists in the
current system partly because the most creative and diligent lawyers do
not enter the scene until an execution date has been set. Furthermore,
until an execution date is set, the lawyer has no incentive to work on the
habeas petition. The lawyer will prefer to work for paying clients, which
the death row inmate usually is not, and under the present system, will
postpone serious work on the habeas petition until the execution date is
imminent. Certainly the lawyers are at fault, but so is the system that
encourages this conduct; and the system is one that the state can easily
remedy.
232
Despite the eagerness of many players in the federal government to
suggest reforms, the proposals they have offered ignore the fundamental
problem from which all other evils stem: inadequate representation at
the trial level.233 Judge Jones does advert to the problem when she ex-
plains that the cases.are expensive to litigate while the clients are indi-
gent.234 But the concrete proposals from Congress and the Powell
Commission doggedly refuse to address this central problem. Current
231. See supra text accompanying note 198.
232. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 32, at 134-56.
233. This is not true of the ABA Report. Robbins, supra note 32, at 14-27. In a recent
article, Professor Berger examined the two major proposals. Berger, supra note 33. She aptly
characterizes the Powell Committee Report as a band-aid, id. at 1674, and the ABA Report as
surgery, id. at 1684. While the ABA Report does recognize the importance of adequate trial
counsel and acknowledges that reform at this level of the system must be the linchpin of any
habeas reform, it suffers from lack of unanimity among task force members. See Robbins,
supra note 32, at 14. Nevertheless, this should not obscure the insight of the ABA, and in view
of it, it is all the more remarkable that neither the Powell Commission nor the congressional
proposals were sufficiently sensitive to this point. The ABA Report specifies certain threshold
qualifications that counsel in death cases would have to possess, but it leaves the appointment
to state authorities, roughly the same actors that do the appointing at present. This is unwise,
and the proposal I offer in the text departs from the ABA suggestion.
234. See Jones, supra note 229, at 851.
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doctrine makes it virtually impossible for habeas petitioners to receive
the retroactive benefit of new rules, and a capital defendant's lawyer is
not deemed ineffective merely because the lawyer lacked the skill or inge-
nuity to preserve or articulate the new rule. Consequently, under ex-
isting law we stand to execute citizens whose trials, at either the guilt-
innocence or sentencing phase, were potentially constitutionally in-
firm.235 Doctrine seems unlikely to change soon. This is so even though,
as suggested above, doctrine is incoherent as a philosophical matter, and
even though it is within Congress' power to overrule Teague. Hence,
given current doctrine, the only way to give capital cases the heightened
level of care that the Court has insisted they receive 236 is to provide much
better lawyers at the trial stage.
The key to reforming the present system within current doctrine is
to redouble efforts to locate competent counsel to represent capital de-
fendants at their trials. The following proposals are offered with this goal
in mind:
1. Establish federal public defenders offices for the purpose of pro-
viding trial counsel to capital defendants.237 These offices would be mod-
elled in part on existing federal public defender offices and in part on the
Resource Centers that currently exist in several death penalty states.
(These Resource Centers have acquired expertise in death penalty litiga-
tion, for they are charged primarily with the responsibility of locating
counsel to represent death row inmates in their habeas proceedings and
with assisting such counsel.) Offices would be established in every state
that has a death penalty statute and that opts into this system. Opting in
would be prerequisite to obtaining the benefits of any reforms of the
habeas rules.
(A) Salaries for these employees would be set by Congress,
with one-half the salary being paid by the federal government and one-
half to be paid by the state.
(B) In addition, a budget providing for support and investiga-
tion would also be created, with the funding coming from Congress and
from states with death penalty statutes. The contribution by each state
would be adjusted to reflect the demand placed by that state on the sys-
tem. This demand would be measured primarily by the number of death
row prosecutions per year and the number of death row inmates. The
235. I say "potentially" because the merits of the constitutional issue evade review.
236. See supra note 4.
237. Congress might enact such a program using its enforcement powers under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress could presumably condition receipt of federal monies
on a state's compliance with this program. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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percent contribution by each state would thus bear a rough similarity to
the size of that state's death row population.238
(C) Lawyers from these offices would not pursue a defendant's
direct appeal. 239 The states, however, in order to opt into this system,
would be required to demonstrate that indigent capital defendants were
also being provided with highly competent appellate counsel.
(D) Even in the infrequent cases where defendants prefer to
Tetain private counsel rather than receive a federal defender, a federal
defender would nonetheless be assigned to work with the defendant's pri-
vate counsel. For the rare cases in which a public defender is not needed,
a statutory waiver provision would be established.24°
2. States that choose not to opt into this system can obtain a
waiver from Congress by demonstrating the existence of a local public
defender office that provides reasonably comparable representation. The
burden would be on the state to establish equivalence, though it is as-
sumed that systems like those in California, Kentucky, and Miami would
satisfy the standard.
3. States either opting into the system or obtaining the waiver
would be permitted to avail themselves of the "one bite at the [habeas]
apple" proposals, in whatever form they ultimately take.
4. All states with death penalty statutes would be required to per-
mit the capital defendant to waive the right to have a jury impose sen-
tence, even after choosing to have the jury determine innocence versus
238. Under such a system, states like California, Florida, and Texas would contribute more
because the size of their death row populations is much larger than most. See NAACP LEGAL
DEFENSE & EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., DEATH Row, U.S.A., Aug. 23, 1991, at 9, 13, 29
(indicating that Texas has the largest death row population (343), with California (305) and
Florida (297) close behind).
239. The reason for this is that the process must be amenable to a claim on direct appeal
that trial counsel was ineffective. Although the obvious purpose of placing such a premium on
trial counsel is to preclude ineffective trial lawyers from representing indigent capital defend-
ants in the first place, the ineffectiveness argument must still be available to the appellate
lawyers. Cf. A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 32, at 15 (recommending appointment of new appel-
late counsel because of unlikeliness that trial counsel would raise ineffectiveness challenge).
240. A problem here is that many indigent defendants believe that the private lawyers they
can afford to hire will be better than public defenders. This is usually not the case, as the
lawyers capital defendants can afford to hire are usually not especially qualified. (The data on
Kentucky, for example, bear this out.) Nevertheless, these defendants obviously have the right
to choose their own counsel. Yet to insure adequate representation, lawyers from the public
defender's office should assist the privately retained counsel. The idea is to ensure that a Hor-
ace Butler, for example, receives a federal public defender even if he does not want one. At the
same time, the waiver is necessary since we will not need a public defender to shadow someone
like Racehorse Haynes.
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guilt.241 Judges, unlike juries, are aware of the range of crimes that can
be prosecuted as capital murder, and a particular defense attorney may
believe that the client's crime is not especially lurid. In addition, defense
counsel may know the views of a particular judge toward the death
penalty.
Even when the defendant elects to have the jury determine the sen-
tence, states must permit defense counsel to place before the jury at the
sentencing phase evidence of other crimes that have gone unpunished by
the death penalty in that jurisdiction.242 State statutes would have to
allow this evidence in order for those states to take advantage of expe-
dited habeas procedures. The jury is a one-shot body, and jurors tend to
believe that the facts they are hearing are the most grisly that ever oc-
curred.243 Hence, heinous murderers succeed in evading the ultimate
punishment, whereas more routine murderers are fortuitously con-
demned.2' In cases where the public defenders so choose, they would be
permitted to inform the jury of other cases.245 The narrative would be
241. There might be some doubt about the constitutionality of this proposal, but I am
persuaded that the right to a jury trial is an individual right that belongs to the criminal
defendant; it is his to waive or invoke. See Dow, supra note 185; Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of
Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196 (1991). But see Singer v. United States, 380
U.S. 24, 34-36 (1965) (holding that effectiveness of defendant's waiver of right to a jury trial
can be conditioned upon consent of prosecuting attorney and trial judge); Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (stating in dicta that court and government must consent to
defendant's waiver). These cases strike me as patently incorrect. Cf Linda E. Carter, Main-
taining Systemic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel to Present
Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death, 55 TENN. L. REv. 95 (1987) (argu-
ing against allowing defendant to waive). See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
158 (1968) (noting that right to a jury trial is fundamental and that defendant may waive it in
many jurisdictions).
242. See FEINBERG, supra note 23; KANT, supra note 143. But cf. van den Haag, supra
note 146 (arguing that maldistribution of any punishment, including the death penalty, is irrel-
evant to the penalty's justice or morality).
243. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEisAL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
244. See Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 1670, 1676 (1986) (citing the example of Charles Manson in arguing that death pen-
alty is often not used on the most heinous criminals).
245. This proposal is in line with the general argument that the sentencing jury should
have more information rather than less. The rationale that underlies this particular proposal is
not dissimilar from the rationale that permits the defendant to make a plea for mercy without
being subject to cross-examination, a device known as a Zola plea. See J. Thomas Sullivan,
Use of the Zola Plea in New Jersey Capital Prosecutions, 21 SETON HALL L. Rnv. 3, 56 (1990)
(arguing for Zola plea, essentially a plea for mercy, as a means to personalize the capital de-
fendant). Whether particular trial counsel choose to avail themselves of this technique might
be an issue not reviewable in subsequent ineffectiveness challenges. On the areas where the
standards for capital trial counsel are more definitive, however, see Gary Goodpaster, The
Trial for Life Effective Assitance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 299
(1983) (discussing obligations of trial counsel); A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT
AND PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES (Feb. 1989).
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agreed to in advance by the prosecution and defense. The ability of the
Supreme Court to distill the ostensibly essential facts in death penalty
cases shows that such encapsulations are feasible. The narratives would
take the form of the introductory paragraphs that routinely grace
Supreme Court opinions in death penalty cases.246
Conclusion
On July 19, 1990, Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the
denial of the writ of certiorari in the capital case of Boggs v. Muncy.2 47
They filed their usual opinion:
Adhering to our views that the death penalty is in all circum-
stances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments, we would grant the application for
stay of execution in order to give the applicant time to file a peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari, and would grant the petition and va-
cate the death sentence in this case.248
On the following day, Justice Brennan resigned from the Court. Exactly
one week later, on July 27, 1990, the Supreme Court denied the stay
application and petition for a writ of certiorari in the capital case of Ber-
tolotti v. Dugger.249 This time the dissent was different:
Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances
cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments, I would grant the application for stay of exe-
cution in order to give the applicant time to file a petition for a writ
of certiorari, and would grant the petition and vacate the death
sentence in this case.25°
The grammar in the boilerplate had changed; it had become singular
rather than plural. "My" replaced "our"; "I" replaced "we." For nearly
a year, Justice Marshall stood alone. Then, on June 27, 1991, he too
retired. The boilerplate has now disappeared entirely. Among the mem-
bers of the current Court, not a single Justice believes that capital punish-
ment categorically and unequivocally violates the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Brennan-Mar-
shall view is a minority view as a matter of politics as well as a matter of
law, but it is an important view, one that deserves an advocate. Our
nation is the only western democracy that sanctions the power of the
state to execute its own citizens. And on our highest Court, not a single
voice rises up in protest.
246. See, e.g., Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990); Saffile v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
247. 111 S. Ct. 2 (1990).
248. Id. (Brennan, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
249. 111 S. Ct. 2 (1990).
250. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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At the same time that we accept this ultimate punishment, however,
both our legal and political values counsel caution and extraordinary
care. Our values, constitutional and cultural, decry haste and fatuous-
ness. Though we may approve of the imposition of death, we recognize
that inflicting this awesome sanction is a serious matter, and the entire
process of imposing it must be marked by compunction and solemnity.
We betray these essential values when we diminish the gravity of death,
when we permit flippant judges to order the execution of indigent defend-
ants who are represented by counsel that is, at best, minimally compe-
tent. We mock our Constitution when we rush to judge. What marks
our greatness, what distinguishes our culture, what separates "us" from
"them" is our values. But currently, in the realm of capital punishment,
our values are losing.

